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ABSTRACT
This dissertation attempts to show the utility of discourse 
analysis for professional writing. The articles collected here fall 
into three categories: Chapter One provides an overview of the need
for a discourse analysis approach in writing research; Chapters Two 
and Three demonstrate applications of Speech Act Theory to problems 
in tone; and Chapters Four, Five and Six suggest the role that 
cohesion and coherence play in professional writing.
Chapter One notes that, with the emphasis on process, discourse 
based research has largely fallen out of favor with writing
specialists. Despite this lack of enthusiasm, this chapter
demonstrates the importance of discourse knowledge in the writing 
process of expert writers and suggests areas of discourse research 
which could enhance writing pedagogy.
Chapters Two and Three begin with the observation that advice 
about tone is often too vague and unprincipled to truly benefit 
novice writers. Chapter Two illustrates that advice about the use of
iv
syntactic positioning of pronouns for manipulating tone (called the 
you-perspective) can be better understood by looking at two types of 
speech acts: directives and commissives. Chapter Three demonstrates
that advice about the use of explanations in refusal letters (called 
negative messages) can be better understood by examining the felicity 
conditions on the speech act of refusing, also taken from Speech Act 
Theory.
Chapters Four, Five and Six explore theories of cohesion and 
coherence and their importance in enhancing the quality of
professional writing. Chapter Four notes that current theories of 
cohesion are inadequate for describing well-written professional 
texts and proposes a Repetition theory of cohesion based on
perceptual principles. Two types of repetition are distinguished: 
semantic and formal. Chapter Five illustrates the variety of formal 
cohesive devices used in professional writing, but which are excluded 
from current theories of cohesion. Finally, Chapter Six explores the 
distinction between cohesion and coherence. A Fulfillment theory of 
coherence is proposed. Two coherence conditions on cohesion (i.e.,
repetition) are also proposed: the Redundancy Condition on semantic
cohesion and the Similarity Condition on formal cohesion.
CHARTER ONE
DISCOURSE BASED RESEARCH:
THE NEED FOR A MODEL OF DECLARATIVE DISCOURSE KNOWLEDGE
1
Chapter One - 2
THE NEED FOR DISCOURSE RESEARCH
In his discussion of the state of writing research 1n 1987, 
Corbett writes, "1n some cases, the emphasis on process became so 
extreme that attention to the product virtually dropped out of 
sight. What we need to do now is redress the balance" (1987:451). 
Unfortunately, such a balance has not been achieved. In this paper, 
I will attempt to encourage more discourse based research1 by 
demonstrating the crucial role of discourse knowledge 1n the writing 
process.
As one example, consider a writer who 1s composing a letter to 
the management of her apartment in order to request that they fix a 
long-standing problem with leakage around her patio doors. The 
writer has come to the end of her letter and has written "When will 
you be sending someone to fix the doors?" At this point, the writer 
stops and considers the tone of her request. She recognizes that her 
request may actually hinder getting her doors fixed by making the 
reader angry. So she decides she must reword her request as "W111 
you send someone to fix the doors as soon as possible?" How can we 
explain the writer’s ability to Improve the tons of her writing? One 
explanation consists of noting that the writer changed the wording of 
her request as a way to manipulate her reader’s reaction. Her
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ability to revise depended on her ability to access her knowledge of 
discourse tone. Specifically, the writer had to know (albeit 
Implicitly) that questions beginning with when, what, how, etc. 
presuppose the truth of the proposition expressed by them, while 
other question types do not. In order to avoid angering her reader, 
the writer changed the question type to one which didn’t presuppose
that the reader would fulfill her request; thus Will vou... was
judged to be an Improvement over When w111 vou... (See Riley and 
Parker 1989 for a comprehensive discussion of tone problems caused by 
presupposition.) The point here 1s that, without the relevant
discourse knowledge of tone, the writer would have been stuck with
her first wording or would have had to stab blindly 1n the dark for a
different way in which to word her request. In this paper, I want to 
provide similar examples of the Importance of discourse knowledge in 
the writing process 1n order to encourage more discourse based 
research.
To this end, the first section of this paper addresses the
importance of discourse research. First, I want to clarify the 
distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge and then to 
demonstrate the importance of declarative discourse knowledge 1n the 
writing process. Second, I want to illustrate the actual and 
potential utility of discourse research for improving writing 
pedagogy by providing a model of writers’ declarative discourse
knowledge. The second section of this paper addresses two attitudes
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which may pose potential obstacles to discourse based research. 
First, I want to show that the object of study 1n both process and 
discourse research 1s the human mind. And, second, I want to
encourage writing specialists to take responsibility for applying 
discourse theory to writing problems instead of depending on those 
outside composition.
Distinguishing Models of Declarative and Procedural Knowledge
It has become commonplace to postulate that humans possess two
different although related types of knowledge. In simplest terms,
declarative knowledge is knowledge of what, while procedural 
knowledge is knowledge of how (Glaser 1984). Discourse theories
provide a model of one type of declarative knowledge used by writers, 
while process theories provide a model of the procedural knowledge 
used by writers. Although using different terminology,2 Radford 
provides an illuminating analogy for understanding this distinction.
Municipal regulations specify certain conditions 
that houses must meet: viz. they must be built out 
of certain materials, not others; they must 
contain so many windows of such-and-such a size, 
and so many doors; they must have a roof which
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conforms to certain standards...and so and so 
forth. Such regulations are in effect
well-formedness conditions on houses. What they 
do not do 1s tell you how to go about building a
house; for that, you need a completely different
set of Instructions, such as might be found e.g. 
in Teach Yourself Housebuilding (1981:91).
In this analogy, the 11st of conditions you must know 1n order to 
follow the municipal housing code constitutes a kind of declarative 
knowledge of houses, while the list of steps you must know 1n order 
to actually build a house constitutes a kind of procedural knowledge.
Let’s turn now to an example of this distinction in writing. As
Stein notes, spellers have both declarative and procedural knowledge 
of spelling (1984:191). A complete model of declarative knowledge of 
English spelling would consist of a list of the conditions which must 
be met for any and all English words to be spelled accurately. For
example, we would need a rule that states that the phoneme /f/ can be
represented graphemlcally as f (1n fat), eb (1n photo). or gh (in 
coughing). In addition, we would need a principle that states that 
/f/ 1s represented as gh only at the end of a morpheme. As this
example shows, the 11st of principles required to account for the
spelling of just the phoneme /f/ would be quite long. Nevertheless, 
the complete list of such rules and principles would constitute a
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model of the declarative knowledge that a speller possesses. Note 
that the model exists outside real time. In other words, the model 
is not concerned with the obvious fact that no one individual speller 
is likely to know every one of the rules and principles 1n the
model. Instead, the model is concerned with accounting for any and 
all accurate English spellings. The model accomplishes this by
assuming a hypothetical, ideal speller who would, in fact, know every 
rule and principle of English spelling.
In contrast, a complete model of procedural knowledge of English 
spelling would consist of a list of any and all the steps or
processes which spellers use to spell English words. For example, 
spellers make use of some of the following processes. First, if 
photo is a familiar enough word, spellers may access Its spelling as 
a whole word; second, spellers may use letter names to determine the 
vowels in photo: third, spellers might match phonemes with graphemes 
to spell foto or Photo: and fourth, spellers might use their
knowledge of the spelling of photo to spell photograph by analogy 
even though the second vowels 1n each are not pronounced in the same 
way. Clearly, our procedural model must be concerned with knowledge 
in real time as it 1s used by real spellers. Unlike the declarative 
model of spelling, this procedural model must account for individual 
differences in spelling. For Instance, some spellers may never use 
the letter name process noted above, while others use it only at the 
early stages of learning to spell. Even one individual may use
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different spelling processes 1n a unique order on the same spelling 
problem at different times.
It is Important to note here that some (although not all) the
spelling processes can only be understood by reference to the model 
of declarative spelling knowledge mentioned above. For example, we 
could not understand why a speller produces foto for photo without a 
model of the Ideal speller’s knowledge that /f/ can be represented by 
either f or fih. Thus the declarative knowledge of spellers 1s part 
of their procedural knowledge. In other words, spellers use their 
declarative knowledge 1n real time spelling processes. This point is 
especially Important for the purposes of this paper. Without a model
of what the spelling system is, we cannot hope to build a
comprehensive model of how people spell.
The Importance of Declarative Knowledge
Writing about overall problem-solving ability, Glaser states that 
"h1gh-apt1tude Individuals appear to be skillful reasoners because of 
the level of their content knowledge as well as because of their
knowledge of the procedural constraints of a particular problem form" 
(1984:99). Flower, Hayes, Carey, Shriver, and Stratman note the 
importance of the writer’s knowledge 1n revising:
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The writer must possess strategies for dealing with the 
problems detected. Responding to problems in texts draws on 
both declarative knowledge about texts and their features 
and procedural or how-to knowledge such as strategies for 
making revisions...(1986:19).
Thus writers, as problem-solvers, must have both declarative and 
procedural knowledge.
Flower et al. argue that the ability to recognize "patterns" 
(i.e., to categorize problems without necessarily naming them) when 
revising is the distinguishing characteristic of expert as opposed to 
novice writers (1986:42). Riley (1988) provides a useful example of 
pattern recognition. Imagine that two ESL students write, “I will 
taking physics next semester." Student One’s declarative knowledge 
of English includes the fact that modals are always followed by 
uninflected verb forms. Student Two has no relevant declarative
knowledge. As the result of his declarative knowledge, Student One
can recognize will taking as a pattern (i.e., as a modal followed by 
a verb form) and can change taking to the uninflected form take based 
on his knowledge of the pattern. In addition, Student One can handle 
any new verb form problems of this type because of his ability to 
recognize this pattern. In contrast, Student Two is stuck precisely 
becaue he lacks knowledge of the pattern. In this case, we could
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call Student One the expert and Student Two the novice. The only way 
Student Two will become an expert 1s by gaining the relevant 
declarative knowledge which will allow him to recognize the pattern.
To further Illustrate the Importance of declarative knowledge 1n
writing consider Flower et al.’s (1986) Illuminating distinction 
between diagnosis and strategies when revising. Both
strategies must be preceded by the writer’s perception of a problem 
in a text. But detection leads only to rewriting, while diagnosis 
leads the way toward true revising. For example, suppose a student 
writer 1s rereading his text below and feels dissatisfied with 1t.
Things mechanics do not like to see in manuals:
♦Don’t use copies of photos or blueprints. A poor
picture or print cannot be made better on any
copier.
♦When decimal numbers are extensively used to
identify page, chapter, or paragraph, it can be
confusing.
♦Sketches and drawings should be presented
horizontally, Instead of vertically on the page so 
that the person reading 1t need not rotate the
book
(Adapted from Journet & KUng 1984:124).
Chapter One - 10
If the student simply detects some problem with this portion of the 
text, but doesn’t recognize any particular pattern which accounts for
the problem, she has the choice of abandoning these sentences and
rewriting, hoping to do better next time. On the other hand, if the 
student diagnoses the problem with this portion of the text as one of 
unparallel sentence structure, she can abandon these sentences and 
rewrite or simply revise as needed to produce parallel form. Thus 
Flower et al. note that “having the capacity to Diagnose when she
needs to seems to be the defining feature of the expert..."
(1986:42).
Note that it is the student’s declarative knowledge of parallel 
sentence structure that qualifies her as an expert. So expert 
writers have declarative knowledge that allows them to see patterns 
in texts. Unfortunately, as Mi lie notes, writing teachers also often 
fail to recognize patterns and thus use terms such as awkward, which 
are of limited use to novice writers (1986:193). We do not yet have 
a comprehensive model of writers' declarative knowledge. As 
researchers, we have an obligation to find out what declarative 
knowledge writers possess so that, as teachers, we can help novice 
writers to become experts by recognizing patterns in texts. As early 
as 1983, Bereiter and Scardamalia argued that "probably nothing 1s 
holding back progress toward understanding the composing process so 
much as this lack" (1983:23).
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Discourse Research
Obviously, expert writers have declarative knowledge of more than 
spelling and parallel structure. Some of this knowledge 1s
non-linguistic. For instance, the writer of a letter requesting a
refund must have knowledge of the way business is conducted, what are 
reasonable requests in such circumstances, etc. But because the 
writer’s meaning will be communicated 1n writing, he will obviously 
need to rely on declarative knowledge of writing. As I noted above, 
however, there is much missing in our model of declarative discourse 
knowledge. In fact, many areas of discourse knowledge have only 
recently been investigated.
For example, only within the last few years has research begun to 
develop a theory which attempts to account for expert writers’ 
knowledge of tone (e.g., Riley 1988; Riley & Parker 1989; Hagge &
Kostelnlck 1989; Campbell, Riley & Parker 1990; and Campbell
forthcoming). Interestingly, all of this research simply showed how 
available research 1n linguistics/discourse analysis is relevant to 
tone in professional writing. As one example, I propose that the 
need for explanations in so-called negative messages or refusal 
letters is supported by research in Speech Act Theory. I demonstrate 
that writers’ explanations can be classified Into five types: (a) 
denying the existence of a referent in the reader’s request; (b)
denying that the writer is the agent of the reader’s request; (c)
Chapter One - 12
denying that the timing of the requested act is appropriate; (d) 
denying that the writer has the ability to do the requested act; and 
(e) denying that the reader wants the request fulfilled. Expert 
writers’ ability to accomplish a polite tone in such letters is 
partly determined by their knowledge of these five explanatory 
types.
By offering some theories of tone, these recent studies begin to 
fulfill our need for a comprehensive model of the discourse knowledge 
used by expert writers. But there are many areas of expert writer’s 
declarative knowledge of discourse which remain a mystery. For 
example, Hillocks notes the need for research into discourse types 
(1986:233). Despite our need for such research, relatively little 
work has been published in this area in recent years. As noted in 
the introduction, the emphasis on process research has been so great 
in the recent past that discourse research has apparently fallen out 
of favor among writing specialists. To illustrate, consider the 
table below which summarizes the relative number of process to 
discourse studies chronicled in Research in the Teaching of English’s 
annual bibliography (Durst & Marshall 1985-9):
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YEAR PROCESS DISCOURSE
1985 67* 33*
1986 78* 22*
1987 70* 30*
1988 74* 26*
1989 74* 26*
Table 1. Relative Percentages of Process and 
Discourse Studies
The point here 1s that relatively few researchers appear 
Interested 1n studying writing using a discourse based approach. In 
the next section, however, I want to encourage such research by 
considering how a comprehensive model of writer’s discourse knowledge 
can enhance the effectiveness of writing pedagogy.
Discourse Research and Writing Pedagogy
Writing pedagogy has been influenced by discourse theory for many 
years. This influence, however, has produced pedagogical practices 
with varying degrees of effectiveness. For example, as Hillocks
notes in his comprehensive review of writing research, studies have
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shown that grammar Instruction has no positive effect on the quality 
of student writing, while the use of models 1s only slightly more 
effective than grammar Instruction (1986:154). In contrast, 
sentence-combining 1s more effective than free writing and either of 
the foci of instruction listed above. Interestingly, the use of 
scales or lists of criteria was found to be twice as effective in 
improving writing than free writing practice (1986:249). This 
section will consider the relevance of discourse theory to the focus 
of instruction in writing classrooms as well as to the mode of that 
instruction in order to promote the importance of developing a 
comprehensive model of that knowledge.
Focus^of Instruction. In particular, I want to consider the 
use of scales since Hillocks found this focus to be relatively 
effective. Often scales are used with peer review in the revision
process. Berelter and Scardamalia discuss a revision study which
found that students with a 11st of diagnostic cues gave more 
effective suggestions for revision (1987:293). Furthermore, Hillocks 
notes that most studies of the use of scales suggest "that the 
criteria learned act not only as guides for revision but as guides 
for generating new material" (1986:160). Thus the use of scales 
appears to be a very promising focus of instruction. In order to 
demonstrate the reason for this effectiveness, consider the scale 
below which forms a part of a list of criteria for revising
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definitions (Lannon 1988:201-2).
REVISION CHECKLIST FOR DEFINITIONS 
Content
♦Is the type of definition (parenthetical,
sentence, expanded) suited to your purpose
and reader’s needs?
♦Have you documented all data sources?
Arrangement
♦Is the expanded definition unified and
coherent (like an essay)?
♦Do you provide adequate transitions between
ideas?
Stvle
♦Is your definition in plain English?
♦Is it written in correct English?
Although scales may have a more limited scope (e.g. Anderson
1987:767), many scales like Lannon’s include criteria relating to the
content, organization, style and mechanics of the whole written
document.
Consider the first question under Content. A student using this 
checklist while reviewing another student’s definition is guided by
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this first question to consider what type of definition has been 
written, why the reader needs such a definition, how the reader will
use the information in the definition, and whether the type of
definition written matches the reader’s needs. The utility of this 
scale depends on the student’s ability to answer the above
questions. Answering these questions, in turn, requires both 
linguistic and non-1inguistic declarative knowledge. For example, 
categorizing the type of definition requires declarative linguistic 
knowledge of definition types. On the other hand, recognizing the 
reader’s need for the information in the definition requires
non-linguistic declarative knowledge.
Now consider the first question under Arrangement. For this 
question, the scale’s utility depends on the student’s declarative
knowledge of unity and coherence. The student must rely on his
declarative knowledge of coherence to judge this definition and 
ultimately to produce coherent prose if the definition needs revision 
in this area. It seems reasonable to assume that the use of scales
increases the quality of writing simply by getting novice writers to
access declarative knowledge of which they might otherwise remain 
unaware. In other words, the ultimate utility of the scale depends on 
the writer’s ability to access relevant discourse knowledge.
At this point, it is important to note that the student’s 
knowledge need not be conscious. The test for determining 
declarative knowledge of coherence is students’ ability to judge or
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produce coherent prose flat to give an explicit definition of 
coherence. Obviously, most students can judge whether a discourse 1s 
coherent without being able to define coherence. Many of these can 
produce coherent prose, too. Unfortunately, however, there are 
students who do not Intuitively understand how to write coherently. 
The use of scales with such students 1s doomed to fall since these 
students lack the required declarative knowledge. If for no other 
reason, we as researchers must be concerned with our ab11ity to 
give an explicit definition of coherence so that these students can 
gain that knowledge.
Mode of Instructlaflj. Hillocks’ review of research reports that 
the "environmental" mode of teaching 1s more than four times as 
effective as the traditional "presentational" mode and three times as 
effective as the "naturalistic" mode (1986:247). The environmental 
mode is something of a compromise between traditional lectures about 
forms and grammar (the presentational mode) and the reactionary 
workshops using freewriting (the naturalistic mode). For instance, 
while the environmental classroom incorporates pre-writing 
activities, it also includes the use of models and activities which 
focus on producing forms. Therefore, some of the emphasis in an 
environmental classroom will necessarily be on Increasing or 
accessing students’ discourse knowledge in order to aid them in 
producing better writing.
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Earlier, I quoted Hi lie’s observation that teachers often fail to 
recognize "patterns" 1n texts and thus use terms such as awkward
which are relatively useless to students. These patterns (e.g.,
coherence, parallel sentence structure, explanatory types in 
refusals, etc.) constitute part of writers’ declarative knowledge of 
writing. In the last section, I attempted to demonstrate that the 
effectiveness of scales depends on the writer’s ability to access
that declarative knowledge. Thus a promising pedagogical tool is of 
little use with students who lack the relevant declarative 
knowledge. Teachers in environmental classrooms will need to address 
this lack of knowledge.
For example, consider a classroom situation in which a student 
has written a memo containing the following request which a peer 
reviewer perceives as weak, "If you don’t mind, could you send the 
necessary information as soon as possible?" What kind of feedback
can the reviewer give this student to aid her in revising without 
recognizing a "pattern"? It seems he has two choices. First, he can 
simply state his perception that this request is weak. In this case, 
his perception will be useful for revising only if the writer has 
declarative knowledge of what constitutes a stronger request. 
Without that knowledge, the reviewer’s perception is of little use to 
her. Second, the reviewer can rewrite the request for the student. 
In this case, his rewriting will be useful to the writer only if she 
can infer how his revision accomplishes the goal of strengthening her
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request. Without inferring the relevant declarative knowledge, the 
writer will not gain any knowledge that she can use in the future to 
control tone in her writing.
Fortunately, Riley (1988) and Hagge and Kostelnick (1989) offer a 
theory of politeness strategies which makes some of what writers 
know about tone explicit. The teacher armed with these theories 
would be in a much better position to stimulate learning in the 
hypothetical situation above. For instance, the teacher might 
explain to these two students or to the entire class that three 
strategies have been incorporated into this writer’s request (please, 
suspending the truth of the request by using vf and the past tense 
form could, and questioning the reader’s ability by using could) and 
that politeness strategies must be chosen according to weight of the 
request (the imposition on the reader and the social distance and 
power relationship between reader and writer). These theories 
provide an explicit definition of politeness as well as a list of the 
discourse markers which accomplish a polite tone and the contextual 
factors which determine the need for politeness. Providing an 
explanation of tone based on these theories would require relatively 
little classroom time (perhaps 10-15 minutes) and could be used to 
develop exercises in which students actually use the politeness 
strategies to manipulate tone in writing. (See examples in Riley, 
Parker, Manning and Campbell 1990.)
Since discourse theories attempt to discover patterns in texts at
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all levels— from graphemes to words to sentences to whole
discourses— a comprehensive model of discourse knowledge would go a 
long way in Improving our ability to see patterns in texts and thus 
to help novice writers recognize these patterns. Unfortunately for 
writing pedagogues, explicit definitions or theories of all the
relevant discourse knowledge of expert writers are not available to
writing teachers. The following questions provide a sample of what 
such theoretical research might address.3
1. How do writers know the purpose of a
discourse? Do all discourses have a single 
over-riding purpose or a web of interrelated
purposes?
2. How is purpose related to discourse type? How
many discourse types are recognizable and what 
features distinguish them?
3. How are discourses organized? What features
distinguish introductions from conclusions? Is 
organization similar or different for different 
discourse types?
4. How do readers/writers recognize coherence?
What is the relationship between coherence and 
cohesion?
5. Do readers/writers use only semantics to
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determine cohesion? What is the relationship of 
cohesion and formal devices such as alliteration and 
parallel sentence structure?
6. Do readers distinguish technical terms from 
jargon? How?
In addition, experimental studies might, for example, investigate the 
effectiveness of pedagogical tools suggested by such theoretical 
research (e.g., the effect of exercises such as those 1n Riley et al. 
(1990) on writing Improvement or the relative politeness of the five 
explanation types in Campbell (forthcoming)).
In sum, the first section of this paper has attempted to clarify 
the distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge. I have 
argued that access to declarative discourse knowledge 1s vital to the 
writing process. Unfortunately, a comprehensive model of such 
knowledge is not available. In fact, it does not appear to be a 
priority for a majority of writing researchers despite the fact that 
such research might significantly improve writing pedagogy. 
Specifically, the effectiveness of scales relies partly upon the 
writers’ declarative discourse knowledge. But without a
comprehensive model of such knowledge, writing teachers lack the 
explicit definitions and explanations for students who cannot infer 
the principles of effective writing addressed in scales. In 
addition, the effective teacher in an environmental classroom must
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have the ability to make writers’ declarative discourse knowledge 
explicit in order to offer explanations of writing problems and to 
develop effective classroom activities. Again, however, a
comprehensive model does not exist.
POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO DISCOURSE RESEARCH
I have tried to demonstrate the importance of building a model of 
writers’ declarative discourse knowledge in the last section. The 
remainder of this paper attempts to clear away two potential 
obstacles to such research. First, I want to establish that the 
object of study in both process and discourse research is quite 
similar. Second, I want to encourage writing specialists to take
responsibility for applying discourse theory to writing.
The Ob.iect of Study in Process and Discourse Research
Often the results of process research are assumed to provide 
direct evidence for cognition, while the results of discourse based 
research are considered to reflect only the product of cognition. In 
fact, the results of process research are often interpreted as if the 
researchers had direct access to the mind of their subjects. However, 
both types of research investigate the structure of the human mind 
through the analysis of the mind’s products. As Bereiter and
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Scardamalia clearly state, "thinking-aloud protocols and 
clInical-experimental protocols display the products of these 
cognitive activities rather than the cognitive activity itself" 
(1983:13-4). The process researcher has only the tape-recorded or 
transcribed speech of the research subject to analyze, just as the 
discourse researcher has only the oral or written text to analyze.
At present, we cannot access cognition directly (i.e., we cannot 
get Inside the physical brain and see, feel or hear the mind 
thinking). The position we are in with respect to the mind is 
analogous to the position described by Einstein and Infeld with 
respect to physical concepts.
Physical concepts are free creations of the human 
mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely 
determined by the external world. In our endeavor to 
understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to 
understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the 
face and the moving hands, even hears its ticking, but 
he has no way of opening the case. If he 1s ingenious 
he may form some picture of a mechanism which could be 
responsible for all the things he observes, but he may 
never be quite sure his picture is the only one which 
could explain his observations. He will never be able 
to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he
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cannot even Imagine the possibility of the meaning of 
such a comparison (1938:31).4
So, like these famous physicists, writing researchers have no direct 
access to the reality which they want to understand. Instead, we 
must form a model of that reality based on what we can observe— in 
this case the oral and written discourses (including protocols) 
produced by the mind which we seek to understand. Thus neither a 
protocol nor an essay is a direct means of studying cognition, but 
they are the best means currently at our disposal. We analyze these 
products of the mind, assuming that "whatever lawfulness is found in 
the text must reflect lawful behavior on the part of the writer" 
(Bereiter and Scardamalia 1983:11).
The crucial point of this section is that both process and 
discourse research study cognition indirectly through the analysis of 
the products of that cognition. Our discourse models are, therefore, 
just as concerned with the structure of the mind as process models. 
However, these models are obviously different. I stated earlier that 
these two types of models are distinguished by the type of mental 
structures they attempt to model: process research attempts to model 
writers’ procedural knowledge, while discourse research attempts to 
model writers’ declarative discourse knowledge. Both types of 
knowledge are integral to writing.
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ResponsibiHty for Applications of Discourse Theory
Much lack of enthusiasm about applied linguistics or discourse
theory is probably the result of what Raskin and Weiser call 
"method-oriented" applications in which the research is driven by the 
extension of a method or theory in linguistics to composition Instead 
of by a problem within composition which the method or theory can 
address (1987:249).
Riley (1987) provides a distinction which is useful in 
understanding this problem. Although there is a traditional division 
between theory on the one hand and application or practice on the 
other, Riley argues that there is a three-part division among theory, 
application, and practice. Theory is similar to application in that 
both are while practice is On the
other hand, theory is dissimilar to application in that theory is 
concerned with universals, while application and practice are
concerned with specific populations. For instance, consider the 
table below.
THEORY APPLICATION PRACTICE
(a)free radicals animal tissue damage surgery technique
(b)fellcity conditions explanations heuristic for
in refusal letters Inventing explanations
Table 2. Distinction between Theory, Application 
and Practice.
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Example (a) in the table Illustrates that the theory of free-radicals 
in chemistry has ultimately been used to develop a new surgery 
technique within modern medicine. The theory of free-radicals 
describes universal chemical properties. In contrast, the surgery 
technique prescribes a behavior for a specific population (I.e.,
surgeons). The link between the theory and the practice is an 
application in which a researcher d£§££ij2Sd the relevance of
free-radical theory for the of surgeons. A
chemist developed the theory, a surgeon schooled in chemistry (or a
chemist interested in surgery) explained the relevance of the theory
to surgeons, and a surgeon used the explanation to develop a new 
surgery method.
Likewise, example (b) illustrates that the theory of felicity 
conditions (part of Speech Act Theory) can ultimately be used to 
develop a heuristic for business writers composing a refusal letter.
Felicity conditions describe universal characteristics of speech
acts. In contrast, the heuristic prescribes the behavior of the 
specific population of business writers. Again, the link between 
the theory and the practice is an application in which a researcher 
described the relevance of felicity conditions to the specific
population of business writers. A linguist/philosopher developed
the theory, a business writing specialist schooled 1n linguistics (or 
a linguist interested in business writing) explained the relevance of 
the theory to business writers/teachers, and a business
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writer/teacher used the explanation to develop a heuristic for 
writing a refusal letter.
Riley’s theory makes two things clear. First, application and
practice are separate, though related, activities. As Bereiter and
Scardamalia have noted, a requirement that research deal with the 
full act of writing in natural conditions confuses methods with
purposes (1987:51). In other words, the methods adopted when
applying discourse theory in order to better understand writers’
knowledge are not necessarily good (or bad) methods to adopt in
teaching writing. As pedagogues we must take responsibility for
developing and assessing classroom practices suggested by 
applications of discourse theory.
Second, theory and application are separate, though related
activities. Since discourse theory is by definition interested in
more than teaching writing, much of it will be inapplicable to our 
field. However, as I have tried to show by example above, some 
discourse theories are extremely useful 1n Illuminating writing
problems. As researchers, we must take responsibility for finding 
relevant applications of discourse theory. We can assure that
discourse based writing research 1s truly useful only if we educate 
ourselves in discourse theory, thinking always about the problems of
teaching writing and how the theory can solve those problems.5
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CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, I have tried to impress upon the reader the
importance of building a comprehensive model of writers’ declarative 
discourse knowledge. Although declarative and procedural knowledge
are distinct, they bear an Important relationship to one another. A 
comprehensive model of writers’ procedural knowledge will include a 
model of writers’ declarative knowledge, which in turn will include 
discourse knowledge. I have attempted to demonstrate the Impact of
declarative discourse knowledge on the process of writing. In a 
number of examples, the ability to access such knowledge
distinguished novice from expert writers. I have also tried to show 
how a comprehensive model of discourse knowledge can improve writing 
pedagogy, providing theoretical foundations for both the focus of 
instruction (e.g., the effective use of scales) and the most 
promising mode of instruction, the environmental.
Though discourse theory has a great potential within composition, 
relatively few researchers are Involved 1n such research. Therefore, 
I have attempted to clear away two potential obstacles to more 
discourse based research by demonstrating that both discourse and 
process theories provide a model of the human mind. In addition, I 
have encouraged writing specialists to take control of discourse 
based research for themselves, insuring that applications of 
discourse theory will be relevant to writing problems and, therefore, 
useful in improving writing pedagogy.
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NOTES
’Throughout this paper, "discourse based research" refers to 
research 1n such fields as linguistics, socio-linguistics, discourse 
analysis, etc.
2Radford 1s actually explaining Chomsky’s distinction between 
competence and performance models.
3While some of these questions have already been addressed 
(e.g., Klnneavy’s theory of discourse types based on purpose (1971)), 
nothing like a comprehensive understanding of such questions has been 
reached— the kind of understanding which might actually effect the 
practices of writing pedagogues.
4I’m grateful to Frank Parker for making me familiar with this 
quote and the scientific enterprise it describes.
5Parker (1986) provides a concise and very accessable
Introduction to linguistic theory, Coulthard (1977) a concise
introduction to discourse analysis, and Raskin and Welser (1987) 
potential applications of such theory to composition.
Chapter One - 30
REFERENCES
Anderson, P.V. (1987). Technical Writing: A Reader-Centered
Approach. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Bereiter, C. and Scardamalia, M. (1983). Levels of Inquiry in
Writing Research, 3-25. In Research on Writing: Principles and 
Methods. P. Mosenthal, L. Tamor, and S.A. Walmsley (eds.). New 
York: Longmon.
---------------- (1987). The Psychology of Written Composition.
Hillsdale, N.J.:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Campbell, K.S. (forthcoming). Explanations in Negative Messages: 
More Insights from Speech Act Theory. Journal of Business
Communication.
Campbell, K.S., Riley, K. and Parker, F. (1990). 
You-Persoect1ve: Insights from Speech Act Theory. Journal of
Technical Writing and Communication. 20(2). 189-199.
Corbett, E.P.J. (1987). Teaching Compsoltion: Where we’ve been 
and where we’re going. College Composition and Communication. 38(4). 
444-452.
Coulthard, M. (1977). An Introduction to Discourse Analysis. 
London: The Longman Group.
Durst, R.K. and Marshall, J.D. (1989). Annotated Biobllography 
of Research in the Teaching of English. Research in the Teaching of 
English. 23. (4), 424-441.
Chapter One - 31
--------------(1988). Annotated B1obl1ography of Research 1n the
Teaching of English. Research in the Teaching of English. 22 (4), 
434-452.
---------------(1987). Annotated Biobllography of Research 1n
the Teaching of English. Research 1n the Teaching of English. 21
(4), 422-443.
-(1986). Annotated Biobllography of Research in
the Teaching of English. Research in the Teaching of English. 20
(4), 410-429.
-(1985). Annotated Biobllography of Research in
the Teaching of English. Research in the Teaching of English. 19
(4), 405-424.
Einstein, A. and Infeld. L. (1938). The Evolution of Physics:
The Growth of Ideas from Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta. 
New York: Simon Schuster.
Flower, L., Hayes, J.R., Carey, L., Shrlver, K. and Stratman, J. 
(1986). Detection, Diagnosis, and the Strategies of Revision. 
College Composition and Communication. 37 (1), 16-55.
Glaser, R. (1984). Education and Thinking: The Role of
Knowledge. American Psychologist. 39(2). 93-104.
Hagge, J. and Kostelnick, C. (1989). Linguistic Politeness in 
Professional Prose: A Discourse Analysis of Auditor’s Suggestion
Letters with Implications for Business Communication Pedagogy. 
Written Communication. 6. 312-339.
Chapter One - 32
Hillocks, G. (1986). Research on Written Composition: New
Directions for Teaching. Urbana, Illinois: National Conference on 
Research in English.
Journet, D. and Kling, J.L. (1984). Readings for Technical
Writers. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman & Co.
Kinneavy, J.L. (1971). A Theory of Discourse: The Aims of
Discourse. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prent1ce-Hall.
Lannon, J.M. (1988). Technical Writing. Fourth Edition. 
Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown College Division.
Milic, L.T. (1986). Composition via Stylistics, 192-203. In The
Territory of Language: linguistics. Stylistics, and the Teaching of
Composition. D.A. McQuade (ed.). Carbondale, Illinois: Southern 
Illinois University Press.
Parker, F. (1986). Linguistics for Non-Linguists. Boston,
Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Co.
Radford, A. (1981). Transformational Syntax: A Student’s Guide to 
Chomsky’s Extended Standard Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Raskin, V. and Weiser, I. (1987). Language and Writing:
Applications of Linuistics to Rhetoric and Composition. Norwood, 
N.J.: Ablex Publishing Corporation.
Riley, K. (1988). Speech Act Theory and Indirectness in 
Letter-writing Style. Technical Writing Teacher. 15. 1-29.
Chapter One - 33
---------- (1987). Language Theory: Application vs. Practice.
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Modern Language
Association.
Riley, K. and Parker, F. (1988). Tone as a Function of
Presupposition in Technical and Business Writing. Journal of 
Technical Writing and Communication. 18(4). 325-343.
Riley, K., Parker, F., Manning, A.D., and Campbell, K.S. (1990). 
Exercises in Professional Writing. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Parley 
Enterprises.
Stein, N.L. (1984). Critical Issues in the Development of 
Literacy Education: Toward a Theory of Learning and Instruction.
American Journal of Education. 93f1l. 171-199.
CHAPTER TWO
YOU-PERSPECTIVE: INSIGHTS FROM SPEECH ACT THEORY 
INTRODUCTION
Analysts of professional communication generally agree on the 
value of the vou-perspective (also known as the vou-attltude). the 
use of stylistic strategies to convey "an attitude which views the 
situation from the reader’s point of view" (Leslkar 1979:50). Advice 
about how and when to Implement the vou-Derspective. however, 1s not 
so generally agreed upon, and in fact 1s sometimes vague or 
contradictory. For example, Huseman, Lahlff, and Penrose advise the 
writer to “Go through you draft and spot each I reference. Then work 
on the elimination of these words...Now go through the draft and 
Insert some you references" (1988:70). At the same time, though, 
they warn against letting theses vou references become "bothersome 
and noticeable" (1988:70). The problem with such advice lies not 1n 
Its legitimacy but Instead 1n its utility, since 1t reflects a kind 
of “Catch-22": it 1s redundant for the student writer who Intuitively 
understands the you-perspective, but not explicit enough for the 
writer who lacks insight Into this strategy.
This paper uses speech act theory to refine one aspect of advice 
about the ygu-perspectlve by examining Its use 1n two particular 
structures, directives and commissives. A directive Is a speech act 
1n which the speaker/writer (addresser) attempts to get the
34
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hearer/reader (addressee) to behave 1n some required way (e.g., a 
request). A commissive 1s a speech act 1n which the addressor 
commits himself or herself to behave in some required way (e.g., a 
promise). The following section briefly reviews the textbook advice 
about the you-perspect1ve 1n order to demonstrate the need for more 
explicit treatments of this strategy. Next, the relevant concepts 
from speech act theory are explicated. Finally, these concepts are 
applied to sample texts 1n order to show how they predict when the 
you-perspective 1s appropriate and how to Implement 1t.
CURRENT TREATMENTS OF THE YOU-PERSPECTIVE
The goal of the you-perspect1ve appears to be generally agreed 
upon by professional writing specialists. For example, Slgband and 
Bell state that "a you attitude consists of viewing a stuatlon from 
the other person's point of view" (1986:587). Similarly, Leslkar 
says that "you-v1ewpo1nt writing 1s writing which emphasizes the 
reader’s Interests and concerns" (1979:50). (See also Wilkinson, 
Wilkinson, and V1k 1986:126; Dumont and Lannon 1987:118; and Bonner 
1986:14). While stating the goal of the vou-perspective 1s helpful 
and necessary, novice writers also require an explanation of how to 
reach that goal. To this end, many professional communication 
textbooks Include advice about how to create the vou-perspect1ve. 
However, this advice 1s not always explicit or principled enough to
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benefit novice writers.
For example, Wilkinson et al. tell beginning writers that "making 
your reader or listener the subject or object of most sentences will 
help you keep you-v1ewpo1nt interpretation" (1989:127). The 
following hypothetical text, however, Illustrates problems that may 
arise when a writer follows this advice.
(1) You will not receive credit for the shoes vou purchased 
because you did not honor the terms of your warranty.
Note that the reader has been made the subject of each clause through 
the use of the second person pronoun. Even though this example
adheres to Wilkinson et al.’s advice, however, 1t does not achieve 
the goal of the you-perspective, which 1s to emphasize the benefits 
of the writer’s action tot he reader. Bowman and Branshaw offer 
similar advice: “One measure of the you-att1tude 1s to count the
vou’s and compare that number to the number of U s  and we’s. When 
you can. make the reader or the reader’s company of product the 
subject of object of your sentences” (1980:48). Again, however, this 
kind of simple metric cannot guarantee the desired effect, as 
Illustrated 1n example (1).
Some authors appear to recognize the limitations of their advice 
about how to create the you-perspect1ve. For example, Huseman et al. 
warn against the exclusive use of second person pronouns: “1f making
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the reader the center of attention might bring offense, then shift to 
the we or I approach" (1988:75). Murphy and Hlldebrandt likewise 
advise writers to begin their text with you or vour only 1f this 
strategy is "psychologically desirable" (1988:42). They advise 
against using the second person when the reader has made a mistake or 
expressed an opinion that differs from the writer’s (1988:44).
Hlmstreet and Baty place similar constraints on the you-perspect1ve. 
advising writers to use the second person for presenting positive 
Ideas and to avoid 1t for presenting negative Ideas (1984:59. (See 
also Bowman and Branshaw 1980:48 and Leslkar 1979:50.) Bonner goes
so far as to claim that "the vou attitude...can be established more
naturally by sing I and we than by omitting these pronouns"
(1986:14).
In short, while advice about how to create the you-perspective 
generally concerns the use of personal pronouns and syntactic 
positioning with a sentence, the advice suffers from tow basic 
limitations. First, none of the authors provides a sufficiently
explicit account of how the you-perspect1ve 1s created and when 1t is
appropriate. Second, the advice at times seems vague or
contradictory. Some authors suggest that second person pronouns be
used almost exclusively; others Insist that first person pronouns
play a significant role 1n you-perspect1ve. Even when the second
person pronoun 1s emphasized, some analysts suggest that either 
subject or object position 1s an equally effective place for 1t to 
appear.
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LINGUISTIC CONCEPTS
Speech Acts
The concept of speech acts 1s primarily the result of work by 
Austin (1962) and Searle (1968, 1975). Austin’s Insight was that, 1n 
addition to saving things, language can also be used to do things. 
The sentences below provide examples.
(2) I promise you to have the report on your desk 1n the 
morning.
(3) I order you to have the report on my desk 1n the morning.
According to Austin’s theory, the effect of uttering a sentence like
(2) is to commit an act of promising. Likewise, the effect of 
uttering (3) 1s to Issue an order. Austin notes that certain other 
verbs can also perform acts when uttered under the right 
circumstances (e.g., thank, vow, advise, forbid, congratulate, give. 
name, apologize, etc.).
Searle extends Austin’s basic Insight by grouping speech acts 
Into three functional categories: Directive, in which the addressor 
attempts to get the addressee to behave In a certain way; 
commissives. 1n which the addressor commits himself or herself to 
behave 1n a certain way; and constatlves, 1n which the truth of a 
proposition 1s asserted, (For our purposes here, only the first two
Chapter Two - 39
categories of speech acts are relevant.) The sentences below are
representative of the class of directive speech acts.
(4) Get Harris on the phone!
(5) You should use my broker.
(6) Would you type this memo?
Uttering any one of these sentences, under appropriate circumstances, 
performs a speech act Intended to elicit some specific behavior from
the addressee. In (4), the act performed by uttering the sentence 1s
an order; 1n (5), a suggestion; and 1n (6), a request. In each case, 
the addressor wants the addressee to act in some prescribed way
(I.e., by making a phone call 1n (4), by con5contract1ng a particular 
broker 1n (5), or by typing a memo 1n (6)) as a result of the 
addressor’s utterance. Host Importantly, however, note that the 
subject (either explicit of understood) 1n each of these directives 
1n the second person vou.
Let's turn next to the group of speech acts called commissives. 
The following sentences are representative of this class.
(7) I promise the report will be on your desk 1n the morning.
(8) I accept your terms.
(9) I’ll help with the dishes.
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These sentences, when uttered under appropriate circumstances, all 
perform speech acts which commit the addressor to some specific 
behavior. In (7), the act performed by uttering the sentence 1s an 
act of promising; 1n (8), an act of agreement or acceptance; and 1n
(9), an act of volunteering. Once again, the Important point to note 
1s the person of the subject: in each of these commissives 1t 1s the 
first person I.
In short, the subject of a directive 1s normally second person 
(I.e., you) and the subject of a commissive 1s normally first person 
(I.e., I/we).
Semantic Roles
Fillmore (1968) proposes a treatment of noun phrases (NPs) which 
describes their semantic role 1n relation to the verb and other NPs 
1n a sentence. Sentence (10) Illustrates some of these roles.
(10) The secretary typed the letter for her boss with 
1 2 3
a typewriter.
4
According to Fillmore’s theory, NP1 functions as the agent, or 
volitional performer of the action described by the verb. NP2 
functions as the patient, or thing affected by the action of the
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verb. NP3 functions as the beneficiary, or thing which benefits from 
the action. Finally, NP4 functions as the Instrument, or thing which 
Is used to carry out the action.
In English, the normal position for the agent is subject and 
normal position for the beneficiary 1s object of the preposition to 
or for. At the same time, however, Fillmore’s theory also captures 
the fact that a given semantic role (e.g., agent patient, 
beneficiary, instrument) can be instantiated by one of a number of 
syntactic construction (e.g., subject, object, object of a 
preposition). In sentences (11-13), for example, the semantic role 
of Instrument 1s Instantiated 1n three different syntactic positions.
(11) Subject = A typewriter was used by the
secretary to type the letter for
her boss.
(12) Object = The secretary used a typewriter
to type the letter for her boss.
(13) Object of The secretary typed a letter for
Preposition = her boss on a typewriter.
Conversely, (14-17) illustrate each of the four semantic roles being 
Instantiated 1n subject position.
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(14) Agent =
(15) Patient
(16) Beneficiary
(17) Instrument
The secretary typed the letter 
for her boss with a typewriter.
The letter was typed on a
typewriter by the secretary for 
her boss.
Her boss had the secretary type 
the letter on a typewriter.
A Typewriter was used by the 
secretary to type the letter for 
her boss.
In short, then, a single semantic role can be Instantiated by 
several syntactic constructions, and a single syntactic construction 
can convey several semantic roles.
Interaction of Speech Act Categories and Semantic Roles
We noted earlier that sentences such as (18), which express 
directive speech acts, generally contain a second person subject. In 
contrast, those like (19) that express commissive speech acts usually 
have a first person subject.
(18) Would vou type this memo?
(19) I will ship your materials tomorrow.
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In directives like (18), the addressee functions 1n the semantic role 
of agent (I.e., the volitional doer of the action— typing) as well as 
the grammatical subject of this sentence. In this way, the addressor 
1n such situations attributes the action described by the verb to the 
addressee. So part of the reason we Interpret (18) as a directive, 
despite the fact that the sentence doesn’t use the Imperative form, 
1s due to the use of the second person subject/agent. On the other 
hand, 1n (19) the addressor functions as agent (the party responsible 
for the action of the verb— shipping) as well as the grammatical 
subject. Despite the fact teat the verb promise 1s not used to make 
this a directly conveyed speech act, the use of a first person
subject/agent helps to Insure that we Interpret the speech act as a 
commissive.
These examples illustrate that directive and commissive speech 
acts appear to be mirror Images of each other. Directives have a 
second person agent, while commissives have a first person agent. In 
fact, these speech act categories also mirror each other 1n their 
distribution of beneficiaries, so that the beneficiary 1n a directive 
1s the addressor, while the beneficiary 1n a commissive 1s the
addressee. Clearly, the addressor is the party who benefits from the 
typing requested through the directive 1n sentence (18), while the 
addressee 1s the party who benefits from the promise to ship
merchandise 1n the commissive conveyed by (19). Although the 
beneficiaries are not overtly expressed 1n these sentences,
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alternative versions of them which do express these roles can be 
easily constructed.
(20) Would you type this memo for me?
(21) I will ship your materials to you tomorrow.
In each of these sentences, the pronoun 1n the prepositional phrase
functions a the beneficiary of the action described by the verb.
Directives and commissives, then, are truly mirror images of each 
other in the distribution of the semantic roles of the addressor and 
addressee.
Table 1 Illustrates the distribution of semantic roles in
directive and commissive speech acts.
Semantic Role 
Agent Beneficiary
Speech Act Category
Directive 2nd person 1Bt person
Commissive 1Bt person 2nd person
Table 1. Distribution of roles in speech act categories.
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RELEVANCE OF SPEECH ACT THEORY TO YOU-PERSPECTIVE
The linguistic concepts outlined 1n the previous section can be 
used to refine strategies for achieving the vou-perspective. 
Specifically, these principles allow a more precise statement of when 
and where first and second person pronouns are most effectively used 
in commissives and directives. The fundamental principle underlying 
the distribution of pronouns 1n these structures 1s as follows: 
emphasize the addressee (I.e., reader/hearer) in a positive message 
and de-emphas1ze the addressee 1n a negative message. This section 
discusses ways to achieve these goals 1n commissives and directives.
First, consider the case of commissives. As stated earlier, 
these are speech acts 1n which the addressor (I.e., an agent) commits 
himself or herself to perform some action for the addressee (I.e., a 
beneficiary). In terms of syntactic structure, commissives 
de-emphas1ze the addressee, since the "unmarked" or typical pattern 
1s for the addressor to occupy subject position and the addressee to 
occupy non-subject position. Therefore, the unmarked structure for 
commissives would be a first person subject (representing the 
addressor/agent) and a second person non-subject (representing the 
addressee/beneficiary). This pattern occurs 1n (22) (adapted from 
Bowman and Branshaw 1980).
(22) We will ship your order to vou next week.
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This pattern, however, emphasizes the addressor rather than the 
addressee, since the pronoun representing the addressor occupies
subject position. (Subject position may be thought of as the focal 
point of a sentence 1n that, as Keenan notes, subjects across
languages normally express both the topic and the agent of the 
sentence, and they tend to be the leftmost occurring NP
(1976:318-321)). If we assume that the message conveyed by this
sentence (I.e., the writer’s commitment to ship the goods next week) 
will be perceived positively by the addressee, we have to get the 
pronoun representing the addressee Into subject position. This 1s 
accomplished 1n (23).
(23) You will receive your order from our factory by next week.
Sentence (23) now Implements the you-perspect1ve. It represents 
a positive message and thus should emphasize the addressee. It 
accomplishes this by putting the pronoun representing the addressee 
(I.e., ^ou) in subject position, such a move, however, permutes the 
unmarked pattern for commissives, in which the addressee 1s in 
non-subject position.
In contrast, a commissive conveying a negative message should be 
expressed 1n Its unmarked syntactic form, where the addressee 1s 
de-emphas1zed. Sentence (24), for example, commits the addressor to 
an action that 1s likely to be interpreted unfavorably by the 
addressee.
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(24) We will be shipping your order to you by U.P.S. rather than 
by Federal Express.
Sentence (24) Implements the you-perspectlve by using the unmarked 
syntactic form for commissives. Since (24) represents a negative
message, 1t should de-emphas1ze the addressee 1n order to achieve the 
vou-perspective. I accomplished this by putting the pronoun
representing the addressee (I.e., you) in a non-subject position.
To summarize the situation with commissives: the unmarked
structure for commissives has a first person NP as subject/agent and 
a second person NP as non-subject/beneficlary. This pattern should 
be retained when constructing commissives that twill be perceived 
negatively, since the non-subject position is a less prominent one 
for the reader than 1s the subject position. In contrast, the 
unmarked pattern for commissives should be varied when the commissive 
will be perceived positively, so that the reader/beneficiary 1s 
placed 1n the more prominent subject position.
Now consider the case of directives. As stated earlier, these
are speech acts 1n which the addressee (I.e., an agent) 1s directed
to perform some action for the addressor (i.e., a beneficiary). In 
terms of syntactic structure, directives emphasize the reader since 
the unmarked pattern 1s for the addressee to occupy subject position 
and the addressor to occupy non-subject position. Therefore, the 
unmarked structure for directives would be a second person subject
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(represent1ng the addressee/agent) and a first person non-subject 
(representing the addressor/beneflclary). This pattern 1s 
illustrated 1n (25), where you 1s the Implied subject of the 
Imperative structure.
(25) [You] Return the enclosed questionnaire to us and receive a 
free book.
This pattern emphasizes the addressee since the pronoun representing 
the addressee occupies subject position. If we assume that the 
message conveyed by this sentence 1s positive, then this sentence
conforms to the you-perspect1ve.
In contrast, a directive expressing a negative message should be
framed 1n Its "marked" syntactic form, where the addressee 1s 
de-emphas1zed. consider, for example, the contrast between (26) and 
(27) from Murphy and Hlldebrandt 1988:44.
(26) You failed to enclose your check in the envelope.
(27) The envelope we received did not have a check 1n 1t.
both (26) and (27) function as directives. However, only (27) 
conforms to the you-perspective. It represents a negative message 
and thus should de-emphaslze the addressee. It accomplished this by 
removing the pronoun representing the addressee (I.e., you) from
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subject position and substituting a pronoun representing the 
addressor (I.e., we).
It should be noted that there are occasions when the writer may 
wish to retain the reader as subject/agent 1n a directive even though 
the message 1s a negative one. In a collection letter, for example, 
making the addressee the subject/agent of a negative message may help 
to strengthen the seriousness of the tone. This strategy 1s 
illustrated by the contrast between (28) and (29).
(28) We must receive your payment by March 15.
(29) You must send your payment to us by March 15.
Our analysis of directives predicts that (29) constitutes a stronger 
message to the reader than (28). Even though (28) functions as a 
directive, it uses the first person beneficiary (i.e., we) as 
subject; the second person agent is alluded to only Indirectly by the 
possessive pronoun vour. In contrast, (29) functions as a directive 
and uses the second person agent as subject; 1n contrast to (28), the 
first person beneficiary 1s placed in a less prominent position as 
object of a preposition.
To summarize the situation with directives: the unmarked
structure for directives has a second person NP as subject/agent, 
with a first person NP as object/beneficlary. This pattern should be 
retained when constructing directives that will be perceived
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positively since the subject position 1s a more salient one for the 
reader than 1s the object position. In contrast, the unmarked 
structure for directives should be varied when the directive conveys 
a negative message that the writer wished to de-emphas1ze.
Table 2 summarizes the appropriate pronoun choice for the subject 
and non-subject positions in commissives and directives.
SEMANTIC ROLE PRONOUN POSITIVE MESSAGE NEGATIVE MESSAGE 
Agent 1»* person non-subject subject
COMMISSIVE
Beneficiary 2nd person subject non-subject
Agent 2nd person subject non-subject
DIRECTIVE
Beneficiary 1-t person non-subject subject
Table 2. Recommended distribution of first and second person 
pronouns 1n different message types.
CONCLUSION
Concepts from linguistic theory can be used to refine advice 
about the you-perspective. In particular, speech act theory can be
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used to answer questions about the roles of first and second person 
pronouns 1n this strategy and about the best position (subject or 
non-subject) for these pronouns in different types of structures. 
Our analysis calls for placing the addressee/benef1 clary 1n subject 
position 1n positive commissives and for placing the addressee/agent 
1n subject position 1n positive directives. In negative 
commissives, the addressor/agent should occupy subject position, 
while 1n negative directives the addressor/beneflclary shoudl occupy 
subject position. thus both first and second person pronouns, as 
well as both subject and non-subject position, may be exploited to 
create the you-perspective. depending on the type of speech act and 
its status as a negative or positive message.
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INTRODUCTION
Textbooks generally advise writers to Include an explanation in 
so-called "negative messages" (traditionally as part of the "indirect 
plan"). Textbook authors advise that letters containing such bad 
news should be logical and courteous, and they Include example 
letters which are designed to illustrate these qualities. 
Unfortunately, as Hagge has recently observed about textbook 
discussions of politeness, "What these textbooks ignore is the real 
issue: how courtesy is linguistically encoded in texts" (1989: 50).
A number of researchers have noted that linguistic pragmatics can 
be used beneficially 1n the field of composition. For instance, 
Hagge argues that writers most likely depend on their pragmatic 
linguistic competence Instead of their knowledge of traditional 
rhetorical principles for writing courteously (1989), and Riley 
(1986) argues that linguistic pragmatics 1s widely applicable to 
research in professional communication. In addition, both Stelnmann 
(1982) and Dasenbrock (1987) have proposed that Speech Act Theory 
(one component of linguistic pragmatics), as developed by the 
language philosopher J.L. Austin (1962), provides the foundation for 
our much sought after "New Rhetoric" in composition. Recent 
research has explored the utility of Speech Act Theory for
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understanding some aspects of tone 1n professional communications. 
For example, the theory defines the linguistic cues which produce 
indirectness in letter writing (Riley 1988) and clarifies the most 
effective use of the vou-persoective (Campbell, Riley and Parker 
forthcoming).
In this paper, I continue the line of research that applies 
concepts from Speech Act Theory to professional writing. 
Specifically, I want to demonstrate that this theory supports the use 
of an explanation to maintain goodwill when composing negative 
messages and also provides a useful classification of such 
explanations based on five universal strategies for politely refusing 
requests. This classification, in turn, illuminates some problems 
which novice writers exhibit in inventing (i.e., creating) 
explanations and has some specific pedagogical implications. First, 
current advice about negative messages will be evaluated; second, the 
relevance of a few concepts from Speech Act Theory will be outlined; 
and third, those concepts will be used to illuminate the nature of 
explanations in negative messages.
ADVICE ABOUT USING EXPLANATIONS
Research investigating the use of explanations in negative 
messages is scarce. The majority of research on these messages has 
focused on the "indirect plan." A number of years ago, Harbaugh
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published a letter to the Editor in the ABCA Bulletin, in which he 
argued against indirectness in letters refusing job applicants 
(1977). In addition, Jablin and Krone published the results of their 
analysis of the characteristics of rejection letters to job
applicants in Written Communication. They found that 82X of such
letters contained an explanation. Salerno recently published an 
article 1n the Journal of Business Communication in which he argues 
that buffers are not always effective (1988), and Riley has published 
an article in The Technical Writing Teacher, in which she defines the 
linguistic means for producing indirectness 1n letters (1988). Of 
these, only Jablin and Krone deal specifically with explanations, 
although they were interested in rejection letters as a whole and 
their effect on job applicants.
Despite the scarcity of research into the use of explanations 1n 
writing negative messages, professional writing textbooks are 
amazingly uniform 1n their prescription for and description of them. 
In fact, all of the thirteen textbooks consulted for this paper 
contain prescriptions for the use of explanations when giving bad 
news.1
Typically, professional writing textbooks list the qualities the 
explanation in a negative message should possess. For Instance, 
Wilkinson, Wilkinson and Vik offer a representative statement about 
the need for a "...thorough, logical explanation that is friendly and 
positive" (1986: 190). Other necessary qualities of the explanation
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listed 1n these textbooks Include: convincing, unselfish,
non-apologet1c, non-combative, cordial, and specific. Unfortunately, 
a 11st of the qualities an effective explanation should possess 1s of 
limited practical use to the novice writer actually attempting to 
Invent an explanation or to the teacher trying to explain why a 
particular letter 1s or is not convincing. For instance, a teacher 
might instruct students to reply to a letter from a hypothetical 
customer who requests that the students’ manufacturing company send 
her/him a case of their high-grade motor oil; the student must refuse 
the order because her/his company sells only to wholesale 
distributors. One student’s letter contains only the following
explanation: We regret that we will not be able to fill vour order.
The teacher may suggest that the student consider her audience and 
then revise to make her statement more polite and therefore 
convincing. However, presumably both teacher and student know the 
student’s letter should be convincing; the question is what words to 
write in order to make it so, and if the teacher provides a rewrite 
of the student’s explanation for this refusal letter then the student 
has learned little about how to write explanations for future 
negative messages. What the student needs is an explicit and 
principled prescription for writing a polite explanation. In this 
paper, I hope to show that Speech Act Theory can offer just this type 
of advice.
In addition to listing these qualities though, professional
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writing textbooks provide sample letters which are designed to
Illustrate the qualities of effective explanations. As an example, 
Sigband and Bell discuss a situation 1n which a customer has
requested an exchange on a bathing suit purchased from the writer’s
company and then provide an example of an effective explanation which 
could be used by the writer to respond to the customer. Part of 
their example appears below.
...in keeping with the statutes of this state, garments
of this type may not be restocked after they have been
sold... (1986: 645).
How useful is the authors’ sample to the writing student? If the 
student must compose a negative message for exactly the same
situation, then the example will be Informative (i.e., it can be 
copied). But, unfortunately, without a discussion of this 
particular example 1s effective (i.e., logical, polite, etc.), a 
novice who does not know how to write logically and politely gains
little unless s/he 1s able to infer what specific linguistic cues 
make this example effective.
In fact, each of the textbooks examined for this paper fails to 
discuss bgy their examples produce effective explanations. As 
another example, Dumont and Lannon discuss a situation in which a
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friend requests permission to graze his dairy herd under the power 
lines on fallow land owned by the writer’s company. The authors 
compose a sample letter which informs the friend that the writer’s 
company has been using a defoliant on the land. A portion of the 
authors’ letter is included below.
...The defoliant could affect the quality of your 
product, or worse, the herd itself, since the cows would 
be grazing on the land at least five months a year. I’m 
sure you’d rather not take that chance, nor would we 
(1987:163-4).
Of course, it is highly unlikely that a student writer will need to 
compose a future negative message for exactly this situation. Most 
importantly, without an explanation of the general principles which 
make this example effective, student writers who do not already 
understand how to write effective explanations in negative messages 
gain little from the authors’ example that they can use themselves 1n 
inventing an effective explanation for refusing a different request.
In sum, very little research has investigated the use of 
explanations in writing negative messages, although professional 
writing textbooks consistently advise their use. While these 
textbooks offer writers a list of the qualities that effective 
explanations possess, as well as examples, without a discussion of
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how these examples produce the desired qualities, they are if
limited use to the writers actually attempting to compose a letter or 
to their instructors trying to teach them.
Textbooks typically refer to the type of explanations used in 
conveying bad news according to the kind of request which must be 
denied by the writer (e.g., explanations in credit refusals,
adjustment refusals, or even refusals of favors). I want to 
■ demonstrate that explanations for refusing requests can be classified 
in a way that 1s useful to teachers of professional writing and their 
students. The classification offered is built on principles from 
Speech Act Theory. Therefore, some concepts from that theory and
their relevance to the composition of negative messages will be
outlined in the next section.
SPEECH ACT THEORY AND NEGATIVE MESSAGES
J. L. Austin broke with a long tradition of language philosophers 
by arguing that language is used to gs things in the world, as well 
as to say things about the world (1962). The sentences below provide 
examples.
(1) I promise to give you the gun.
(2) I order you to hand over the gun.
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Uttering sentence (1) actually performs an act of promising; likewise 
uttering (2) performs an act of ordering. Austin noted that there 
are a number of verbs like promise and order that can be used in this 
way (e.g., beg, thank, bet, and congratulate!. He called these 
"performatives." John Searle expanded the work of Austin by arguing 
that every utterance commits a speech act, regardless of whether it 
contains one of Austin’s performative verbs (1969). For example, 
consider the sentences below.
(3) I will give you the gun.
(4) Give me the gun.
(5) Please give me the gun.
(6) He gave me the gun.
Note that uttering sentence (3) performs an act of promising even 
though the verb promise 1s not used (cf. (1) above). In the same 
way, uttering (4) performs an act of ordering, (5) an act of 
requesting, and (6) an act of stating, although no performative verb 
is used.
Since most negative messages are responses to requests, this 
paper concentrates on the speech act request. First, the role of 
requests in the organization of discourse is briefly discussed. 
Second, the concept of felicity conditions is defined. And, finally, 
five strategies for denying requests based on the felicity conditions
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are presented.
Discourse Organization and the Need for Negative Messages
Some speech acts, like requests, require a response and so help 
to organize the structure of discourse. In fact, anv response
which follows a request will be interpreted as a response to that
request (Davidson 1984: 102). For instance, see the examples below
which represent the responses of a secretary to a request from the
boss who says Please get me some coffee.
7. (a) OK.
(b) I’ll make some right away.
(c) Do you want cream and sugar?
8. (a) No.
(b) Nice day, isn’t 1t?
(c) It’s on the table.
9. (Silence)
Note that all of the (7) responses, despite their varied forms, are 
interpreted as compliance with the boss’s request —  we expect the 
secretary to get the boss some coffee. In contrast, the (8) 
responses all refuse the request. In (8a) the refusal is explicit,
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whereas 1n (8b) and (8c) the refusal Is implicit. Interestingly, 
even the silence of (9) is interpreted as a response (of either 
compliance or refusal) to the boss’s request. The point here is that 
requests require a response and that all responses will be 
interpreted as either compliance or refusal. This analysis of 
requests supports the need for writing negative messages since even 
no letter would be interpreted as either compliance or refusal of a 
request, and if the bad news is given 1n a letter the writer has some 
chance to maintain the goodwill of the person being refused.
Conditions on Making Requests
Austin recognized the importance of social context in performing 
speech acts and included within his theory a set of conditions, 
called fel 1citv_£aadLLLi3flSi which must be met in order for an 
utterance to count as a valid act of a particular type. For 
understanding explanations in negative messages, five of these 
felicity conditions are relevant: three propositional content
conditions and two sincerity conditions.
According to Speech Act Theory, there are three propositional 
£2fl£§Di_££Ddliifi!lS which must be met by the utterance used in 
issuing a request 1n order for that utterance to count as a valid 
request. The first condition states that the items referred to in 
the utterance must exist. For instance, this condition would be
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violated 1f a 13-year-old daughter asks her mother Can I get married 
at a plantation, and the mother responds with You’re not getting 
married. In this case, something referred to in the daughter’s
utterance (her marriage) does not exist, and therefore her utterance
does not count as a valid request.
The second propositional content condition requires that the 
addressee must be the actual agent of the action requested. For 
example, this condition would be violated if, while getting on a 
crowded bus, you ask a passenger Could vou move your bag so I can sit 
down, and the passenger responds It’s not my bag. In this case, the
passenger (the addressee) is not actually the agent of the action you
have requested, and therefore your utterance does not count as a 
valid request.
Finally, the third propositional content condition states that 
the act requested must be a future one. This condition would be 
violated if you go to McDonalds’ drive-thru at noon and say I’d like 
an Egg McMuffin and orange .juice, and the voice responds I’m sorry,
but we don’t serve breakfast after noon. In this case, the act you 
requested (serving breakfast) 1s actually a past instead of a future 
act, and therefore your utterance does not constitute a valid 
request.
The first sincerity condition which must be met if an utterance
is to count as a request requires the requestor to believe that the
addressee is able to perform the requested act. As an example of a
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violation of this condition, imagine that a teacher said to his
student Mona, please put vour solution to «5 on the board, when he 
knows that Mona has not done her homework. In this case, the teacher 
lacks the belief that Mona is able to do the requested act (put the 
solution on the board), and therefore his utterance is an
infelicitous request.
Finally, the second sincerity condition on requesting states that 
the requestor must desire that the addressee actually perform the 
requested act. This condition would be violated if a teenage boy, 
planning to go to a movie with his friends, asks his little brother
Why don’t vou come with us in response to his mother’s Insistence
that he take his brother along. In this case, the teenager does not 
actually want his request fulfilled, and therefore his utterance is 
considered an infelicitous request.
Speech Act Theory differentiates cases in which sincerity
conditions are violated from those involving the propositional
content conditions. When a sincerity condition is violated, the 
utterance does count as a valid request; nonetheless, the request 
is considered infelicitous since the requestor lacks the appropriate 
belief or desire concerning the requested act.
In brief, Speech Act Theory describes five conditions which must 
be met in order for an utterance to perform a felicitous request. If
any of the three propositional content conditions are violated, the
utterance is infelicitous and does not count as a valid speech act,
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while if either of the two sincerity conditions is violated, the 
utterance 1s simply Infelicitous. In the next section, I will 
demonstrate that these five felicity conditions provide speakers with 
five strategies for politely refusing requests.
Politeness Strategies and the Need for Explanations
Sociolinguists have noted that the expression of many speech acts 
is socially threatening to both the requestor and the addressee and 
that this fact motivates strategies for lessening the threat (Brown & 
Levinson 1987). These are commonly called "politeness" strategies. 
Both Riley (1988) and Hagge & Kostelnick (1989) have observed that 
politeness is achieved in professional writing through the use of 
such strategies as hedging, passive constructions, and 
nominalizations. Because the speech act request 1s socially
threatening, speakers invoke various politeness strategies to lessen 
the threat (Labov & Fanshel 1977). For example, imagine a situation 
in which two business associates, Mary and John, are at lunch. Mary 
might simply say to John, “Pass the butter." However, she might 
frame her request more politely by questioning John’s willingness to 
pass the butter: "Will you pass the butter?" (See Riley (1988) or
Hagge & Kostelnick (1989) for a comprehensive and insightful 
discussion of such politeness strategies.)
Similar to making requests, refusing requests is also socially
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threatening and therefore motivates speakers to Invoke strategies for 
lessening the threat. Labov & Fanshel noted that "the only way in 
which a request may be refused with reasonable politeness is to give 
an accounting" (1977:) Therefore, the inclusion of an explanation in 
letters conveying refusals is justified.
One politeness strategy for refusing a request involves
suggesting that a felicity condition on requesting has been violated.
(Gordon & Lakoff 1971). In fact, this strategy appears to be the 
most common (Levinson 1983) and also universal (Brown & Levinson 
1987) strategy for politely denying requests. So when addressees of 
a request want not to comply, but also to lessen the the social
threat of refusing, they generally adopt one of the following
strategies for implicitly refusing.
STRATEGY 1: Deny that an item referred to in the request exists.
STRATEGY 2: Deny that the addressee is the agent of the requested
action.
STRATEGY 3: Deny that the requested act is a future act.
STRATEGY 4: Cite reasons for the addressees inability to perform
the requested act.
STRATEGY 5: Cite reasons that the requested action is actually
not desired by the requestor.
Strategies 1-3 are based on the propositional content conditions,
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while Strategies 4-5 are based on the sincerity conditions for the 
speech act request.
The use of any of these five strategies in response to a request 
constitutes a claim that the request is not a felicitous speech act. 
If a request is claimed to be infelicitous, then that request is 
dismissed. In using these strategies, the addressee of a request 
fulfills two, seemingly incompatible desires: first, not to comply 
with the request and second, to maintain cooperative social relations 
with the requestor. Addressees fulfill their desire not to comply by 
dismissing the request with these strategies based on the felicity 
conditions. They fulfill their desire to maintain social relations 
by refusing politely (i.e., implicitly) instead of bluntly (i.e., 
explicitly). Maintaining good relations with requestors appears to 
be what textbooks call "maintaining goodwill" when giving bad news. 
Therefore, politeness strategies like those listed above can be used 
to maintain goodwill when it is necessary to write a refusal letter 
(i.e., most negative messages).
It is important to note that these politeness strategies are 
employed by addressees regardless of the actual validity of the 
requestor’s utterance as a speech act of requesting. For instance, 
imagine that, after reading over a student’s paper and deciding it is
unacceptable, you ask him to revise it. He may claim I did revise
it. Your student has used Strategy 3 (denied that the requested act
is a future act) thereby explaining why your request has been
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dismissed— even though the revision you have actually requested is 
a future act. In other words, despite the actual validity of your
utterance as a request, Strategy 3 dismisses your original request by 
claiming it is not a valid speech act and requires you to use
another request in order to get the revision you want from your
student.2 Note the difference between the use of the strategy
(based on the third prepositional content condition) in this 
situation and the actual violation (of the third propositional
content condition) in the example of your order at McDonalds. The
point here is that the politeness strategies work because they 
that a felicity condition is violated, regardless of whether 
the condition is actually violated.
This section has presented five points of interest regarding 
explanations In negative messages based on Speech Act Theory. First, 
utterances actually perform acts, called speech acts. The act 
performed by most negative messages is a refusal to comply with the
reader’s request. Second, the speech act request requires a response
and that response will always be interpreted as either compliance or
refusal concerning the requested action. This supports the need for 
writing negative messages and predicts that the purpose of such 
messages will be interpreted as either compliance or refusal by the 
reader. Third, utterances must meet certain conditions, called 
felicity conditions, in order to count as well-formed requests. 
Fourth, sociolinguists have investigated the socially threatening
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nature of some speech acts, Including requests and their refusals. 
In addition, these linguists have described politeness strategies 
which are used to lessen the soda! threat Involved 1n refusing 
requests; one of these Involves the inclusion of an explanation. 
Thus, the use explanations is justified in professional writing when 
the reader’s request is refused. And, fifth, there are five of these 
politeness strategies (based on the felicity conditions) which are 
used by the addressee of a request to refuse to comply; each strategy 
dismisses a request by claiming that 1t was not a well-formed speech 
act. The use of these strategies for refusing a request constitutes 
an explanation for the refusal and accomplishes two disparate 
purposes for the writer of a negative message: (a) not to comply with 
the reader’s request by dismissing it and (b) to maintain the 
reader’s goodwill by being as polite as possible.
A CLASSIFICATION OF TEXTBOOK EXPLANATIONS
In this section, I want to demonstrate that explanations for 
refusing a request in negative messages can be classified according 
to the five politeness strategies presented above, and then explore 
the possible impact of that classification on teaching negative 
messages.
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The Classification
Strategy 1. (Deny that an Item referred to in the request 
exists). Since there were no textbook examples of explanations which 
fall into this class, I will provide a constructed example. Imagine 
a situation in which a customer orders a specific kind of light bulb 
which is no longer available. The writer of an explanation simply 
needs to inform the customer that no one makes these light bulbs 
anymore. For instance, I’m sorry, but the KV310 is no longer being 
manufactured. In other words, the writer’s explanation denies that 
the item referred to exists. (Obviously, the writer would want to 
offer some kind of alternative product to the reader, but this would 
not be a part of the explanation.) This explanation is considered 
polite because the refusal is accounted for by claiming that the 
reader’s request was invalid as a speech act instead of explicitly 
refusing to comply (i.e., saying No). I will return to the apparent 
reason for the lack of textbook examples using Strategy 1 after 
discussing examples of the other strategies.
Strategy 2. (Deny that you are the agent of the requested 
act). Sigband and Bell provide an example explanation from a 
negative message which responds to a customer’s request for an 
adjustment on damaged merchandise. The writer 1s advised to inform 
the customer that the c«arrier Inspects material before accepting it. 
The authors' explanation is provided below.
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...We have their [the carrier’s] receipt Indicating that 
this order was turned over to them 1n excellent 
condition. [paragraph break] For this reason you will 
probably want to get In touch with Rapid Freight as 
quickly as possible and enter a claim for the four 
damaged lamps (1986: 641).
Note that the effect of Informing the customer that the carrier 
Inspects merchandise before accepting 1t and of suggesting that the 
customer contact the carrier to make a claim is that of
claiming that the carrier is the proper agent of the request for an 
adjustment, and therefore that the company 1s not. Use of this 
strategy permits the writer to Implicitly refuse the reader’s request 
by dismissing the reader’s speech act. Therefore, the letter is 
perceived as polite (as far as 1s possible) because it responds to 
the reader’s request and accounts for the writer’s refusal without 
explicitly refusing.
Strategy 3. (Deny that the requested act is a future act). 
Lesikar provides an example explanation 1n which a charity has 
requested that a company make a donation. The writer is advised to 
inform the charity of the company’s procedure for contributing to 
charities. A portion of the explanation appears below.
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As our budgeted contributions for this year already have 
been made, the best we can do 1s to place your 
organization on our list for consideration next year 
(1979: 130-1).
In this example, the effect of stating that the company’s 
contributions have already been made for this year is to claim that 
the requested act of donating 1s not a future act. (Of course, the 
offer to put the charity on a list for later consideration may be 
seen simply as a delay of responding to the request, but the way in 
which the delay 1s achieved 1s through the use of the third 
strategy). Again, the letter containing this explanation 1s
perceived as polite 1n part because the writer’s refusal 1s accounted 
for by claiming the invalidity of the reader’s request.
StHliSflY--!* (Cite reasons for your Inability to perform the 
requested act). Bowman and Branchaw offer an example explanation 
which refuses a customer’s order for a tractor to be delivered in two 
weeks. The writer is advised to acknowledge that the usual time of 
delivery is two weeks, and the remainder of their example follows.
Because of the steel workers’ strike and an 
unprecedented demand for Low Tractors this season, it 
will take us six to eight weeks to fill your order 
(1979: 130).
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Note that this example demonstrates the effect of citing reasons that 
deny the company’s ability to comply exactly with the customer’s
request. Once more, this explanation makes the letter polite 1n part
because the writer has accounted for her/his refusal and dismissed 
the reader’s request through the use of this strategy.
It is worth pointing out that this strategy requires more than a 
statement of the writer’s inability; without including the reason 
for the company’s inability to comply, the explanation has little 
"politeness" value. In fact, as most textbooks note, solely citing 
company policy as the explanation for a refusal is as impolite as
simply stating inability. For instance, consider the explanation 
below for refusing the reader’s request to come to work late because 
of baby-sitting difficulties taken from Harcourt, Krizan and Merrier.
Company policy requires that all employees report to 
work at 8 a.m. Your pay would be docked if you were 
to come 1n late... (1987:223).
♦
It seems likely that this kind of "explanation" is unacceptable 
because polite explanations for refusing must demonstrate that the 
writer’s reasons lay outside her/his control, and also be 
personally relevant to the reader. In general, the more attentive
the writer 1s to the reader, the more polite the writer’s response. 
Now compare Harcourt et al.’s suggested revision below.
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The high quality of your work as a courier has been 
possible for at least three reasons: (1) your Interest 
in and enjoyment of the work, (2) your commitment to 
promptness and thoroughness during your rounds, and (3) 
the scheduling of your work at the time 1t is most 
needed— during regular working hours. The flow of work 
1n the Word Processing Center depends on this kind of 
courier service (1987:223).
The improvement 1n tone 1s due to citing reasons for the writer’s 
refusal which appear to be outside the writer’s control and which are 
personally relevant to the reader.3
Strategy S. (Cite reasons that the requested act is actually 
not desired by the requestor). Huseman, Lahiff and Penrose provide 
an example explanation in a negative message refusing a customer’s 
request for a refund on a sale-priced suit which is not defective. A 
portion of their example appears below.
You can be sure that any clothing you buy at Grenier’s 
will be brand new and that you are the original 
purchaser. We feel that we owe that to our customers 
(1988: 169).
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The effect of the authors’ statement that they owe 1t to their 
customers to guarantee their clothing as unused is to imply that this 
particular refusal is necessary for all their customers’ (which
Includes this customer’s) benefit and therefore that the request is 
not actually desired by the reader.
Since violations of the sincerity conditions, on which Strategy 4
and 5 are based, do not invalidate a reader’s request as a speech act
(instead, they claim only its infelicitousness), I would expect that 
Strategy 4 and 5 may be less convincing than the other three based on 
the proposltional content conditions. In fact, if people dislike 
being told that they really do not want what they think they do, 
Strategy 5 could possibly insult the reader.
Interestingly, a number of textbooks suggest an approach to 
explanations which appears to fall under Strategy 5. Bowman and 
Branchaw provide an instance.
...when possible...connect the reasons to a long-term 
reader benefit (for example, keeping prices low, 
providing better service to all customers, receiving the 
exact item of choice, or avoiding credit difficulties)
(1979: 127).
Bovee and Thill offer similar advice: "The tactful business
communicator highlights the benefits of the decision to the audience
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Instead of focusing on the company" (1989: 229). However, as I
suggested about Strategy 4, Strategy 5 also appears to require that
the reasons cited be made personally relevant to the reader 1n order 
for the explanation to be perceived as sufficiently polite. The
following explanation for refusing the reader’s request is taken from
McNally and Schiff.
Billing you on a monthly basis, you’ll agree, would result 
in higher administrative costs that could well result in 
higher rates. Annual payment therefore ensures you of 
efficient service at very competitive rates (1986:190).
In this example, the writer uses Strategy 5, giving reasons why the 
reader does not actually want his request granted. Future research 
might investigate the impact on politeness when explanations are 
carefully tied to the reader’s personal interests. In addition, 
researchers might document the relative politeness of the five 
strategies.
The Pedagogical Implications of the Classification
Now I want to turn to the question of why some explanations for 
refusing requests are more difficult to write than others. Making
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use of the five strategies discussed above, 1t appears that 
explanations which rely on any of the prepositional content 
conditions (I.e., Strategies 1, 2 or 3) are the easiest to use.
Since any of the strategies based on the propositional content 
conditions will necessarily refer to some aspect of the reader’s 
request, little invention (i.e., creative effort) 1s required by the 
writer in a situation which lends Itself to the use of these three 
strategies. For example, the writer who may appropriately claim that 
an item referred to in the reader’s request does not exist (Strategy 
1) need only know what items the reader referred to and whether these 
exist or not. In fact, I think the reason that none of the textbooks 
I used 1n preparing this paper included an example explanation using 
Strategy 1 1s a reflection of the ease with which such explanations 
are composed.
On the other hand, composing explanations founded on the
sincerity conditions (Strategy 4 or 5) appears to be considerably 
more challenging (as evidenced by the proportionately larger number 
of examples using these strategies in textbook examples). With these 
strategies, the writer cannot simply refer to some aspect of the 
reader’s request. Instead, in Strategy 4 s/he must compose reasons 
which imply her/his inability to perform the requested act by
examining the entire situation of the request. For instance, in the
example above which illustrated the use of Strategy 4, the writer
cited the reasons for her/his inability to fill an order for a
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tractor as (a) a steel workers* strike and (b) unusual demand. The 
“material" for composing this explanation lay outside the reader’s 
actual request itself, and so required more Inventive effort on the 
part of the writer.
In addition, composing explanations using Strategy 5 will be 
difficult because the writer must discover reasons which support the 
claim that the reader does not really desire her/his own request to 
be fulfilled. The use of both Strategy 4 and 5 requires thorough and 
effective audience analysis since the reasons composed for the
writer’s inability (in 4) and for the reader’s lack of desire (in 5) 
must be personally relevant to that reader. Furthermore, the writer 
using Strategy 4 must convince the reader that the reasons for the 
writer’s refusal lay beyond the writer’s control in order to be most 
polite.
What strategies will apply in any given situation? It seems 
unlikely that more than one strategy based on the propositional 
content conditions (Strategy 1, 2 and 3) will be applicable in any
one situation, and of course it 1s possible that none of them will
apply; instead Strategy 4 or 5 alone might be appropriate. For
instance, 1f Jane requests a refund on a sale-priced suit from C’s
Fashions, 1t is difficult, though not impossible, to imagine a
situation 1n which Strategy 1 applies (I.e., it seems unlikely that
either the suit, C’s Fashions, or Jane do not exist). It 1s also
unlikely that Strategy 2 could apply in this situation (i.e., Jane
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surely issued her request to the right store, although it 1s 
Imaginable that C ’s Fashions has filed bankruptcy und that Jane will 
be advised to contact their attorneys as the proper agents for 
Issuing her refund.) It 1s also difficult, though not Impossible, to
Imagine how Strategy 3 might apply here (e.g., the store may have
already sent Jane her refund). In any case, it 1s highly unlikely
that a number of these three strategies will apply in any one
situation.
The point here is that, while explanations for a refused request 
will be founded on at least one of these five strategies, each 
request’s situation will dictate which particular strategies are 
applicable. In contrast to the first three strategies, Strategy 4 
would appear to be applicable in anv situation (I.e., the writer is 
always attempting to convince her/his reader of her/his inability to 
fulfill the reader’s request in an explanation for refusing). And 
Strategy 5 might be applicable in a large number of situations 
(however difficult it is to compose reasons that lead the reader not 
to desire for her/his request to be granted).
The differences in the ease of invention and the thoroughness and 
effectiveness of audience analysis which are required in using these 
five strategies suggest that writing teachers initiate novice writers 
to composing negative messages (explanations, 1n particular) with 
assignments for situations 1n which Strategy 1, 2 and/or 3 applies. 
Only later, after students have gained some facility in composing the
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easier explanations, should assignments require them to construct 
explanations for situations 1n which only Strategy 4 and/or 5 may 
apply.
There are other pedagogical implications of this analysis of 
explanations in negative messages as well. For instance, teachers 
armed with the knowledge that explanations are founded on one of five 
strategies should have a distinct advantage In diagnosing the 
ineffectiveness of their students’ explanations. Consider the
example above in which a teacher instructs students to reply to a 
letter from a hypothetical customer who requests that the students’ 
manufacturing company send her/him a case of their high-grade motor 
oil; the student must refuse the order because her/his company sells 
only to wholesale distributors. If one student’s letter contains 
only the following explanation, We regret that we will not be able to 
fill vour order, then the knowledgeable teacher can do more than 
simply note the impoliteness of the student writer’s letter or 
correct this particular letter’s explanation. Instead, the teacher 
can offer the student a general principle for constructing any 
convincing explanation for a refusal: it 1s more polite to deny you 
are the agent of a requested act (Strategy 2) than simply to state 
your inability to comply.
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SUMMARY
In this paper, I have attempted to illustrate the explanatory 
power of the theory of speech acts for understanding explanations in 
negative messages. Such explanations have received little attention 
from researchers in professional writing and yet textbooks 
consistently advise their use. In particular, writers are advised to 
Include logical, polite explanations in negative messages. The 
textbooks’ approach to teaching writers about such explanations 
includes listing the qualities that effective explanations should 
possess and, also, giving example letters which are supposed to 
illustrate explanations with these qualities. Unfortunately for 
writing teachers and novice writers, the textbooks’ examples are not 
as useful as they could be because the authors do not discuss the 
specific linguistic cues which the desired qualities.
In applying speech act theory, I argued that most negative 
messages can be defined as responses to the speech act request, in 
which the writer refuses to comply with the reader’s request. In 
addition, the need for such letters 1s explained by the role of 
requests in the organization of discourse. Moreover, the use of an 
explanation 1n order to maintain goodwill is substantiated by 
research in sociolinguistics. This research has investigated the 
ways in which people lessen the social threat involved 1n some speech 
acts by using so-called "politeness" strategies.
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Most importantly, explanations in negative messages were 
classified into five groups based on universal politeness strategies 
for refusing requests. These strategies are founded on the felicity 
conditions for issuing well-formed requests and amount to a claim by
the writer that the reader’s request has been dismissed because it
was ill-formed. These strategies include:
♦(Strategy 1) Deny that an item referred to in the request 
exists.
♦(Strategy 2) Deny that you are the agent of the requested 
act.
♦(Strategy 3) Deny that the requested act is a future act. 
♦(Strategy 4) Cite reasons for your inability to perform
the requested act.
♦(Strategy 5) Cite reasons that the requested act is not
desired by the requestor.
Although convincing explanations in a negative message will be based 
on one of these strategies, not every strategy will apply in every 
situation. Moreover, explanations for situations in which Strategy 
1, 2 or 3 apply require no real invention on the part of the writer,
while those for situations in which Strategy 4 or 5 apply require 
both considerable inventive effort and a thorough and effective 
analysis of the writer’s audience 1n order to compose reasons for 
refusing that are personally relevant to the reader, as well as 
beyond the writer’s control.
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NOTES
1 The thirteen textbooks include: Bovee & Thill (1989); Bowman 
& Branchaw (1979); Dumont & Lannon (1987); Harcourt, Krizan & Merrier
(1987); Himstreet & Baty (1977); Huseman, Lahiff & Penrose (1988);
Lesikar (1979); McMurrey (1988); McNally & Schiff (1986); Murphy & 
Hildebrandt (1984); Oliu, Brusaw & Aired (1988); Slgband & Bell
(1986); and Wilkinson, Wilkinson & Vik (1986).
2 Although it may seem strange to call the student’s response 
here 'polite,’ note the difference in tone if the student had simply 
responded with No. The use of any strategy is more polite than 
explicit refusal.
3 There is one sincerity condition that I have omitted from 
this paper, which might have provided a sixth strategy: cite reasons 
for your unwillingness to perform the requested act. Since the 
writer must cite reasons in order to be most polite but need not
include an explicit statement of his or her inability, the reader is 
often left to judge whether the cited reasons lead to the writer’s 
inability (Strategy 4) or unwillingness to perform the requested 
act. Obviously, it is more polite to claim inability than
unwillingness since inability presupposes that the writer’s reasons 
for refusing are not within his or her control. For example, imagine 
that you tell your son, Please pick up vour books off the table. If 
he responds with I can’t, you are less likely to get angry with him 
than if he responds with I won’t. It is important to remember that
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the use of a particular strategy for refusing a request need not 
necessarily reflect the actual reason for the refusal; the purpose of 
the strategies 1s to maintain social relations (I.e., to be polite). 
Therefore, even though many decisions to refuse the reader’s request 
in the business world may be the actual result of the writer’s 
unwillingness, if the writer wants to maintain the goodwill of the 
reader by being as polite as possible, he will be better off implying 
that he 1s unable to fulfill the reader’s request. Future research 
might investigate whether readers actually perceive the reasons given 
for refusing under Strategy 4 as unwillingness or inability.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the most comprehensive work on cohesion, HalHday and 
Hasan’s theory (1976) 1s not without limitations. Most Importantly, 
HalHday and Hasan’s theory intentionally excludes formal cohesive 
elements (e.g., syntactic parallelism), while claiming that all 
cohesion 1s a semantic phenomenon. Other researchers have noted that 
one of the problems with Halliday and Hasan’s theory Involves the 
authors’ almost complete reliance on one fictional text for analysis 
(e.g., Johns 1980, Markels 1983, and Stotsky 1983) and, although a 
number of studies have analyzed other discourse genres and expanded 
Halliday and Hasan’s categories to include formal cohesive devices 
(e.g. Witte & Faigley 1981, Markels 1983 and Hartnett 1986), no one 
has offered a theory which captures the nature of both semantic and 
formal cohesion. However, Manning (1988) convincingly Illustrates
the utility of models of visual perception for analyzing discourse. 
Similarly, I will argue here that visual figure-ground perception can 
be usefully applied to an analysis of discourse in order to elucidate 
the nature of both semantic and formal cohesion. Specifically, I 
will propose a repetition theory of cohesion in which cohesion is the
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result of repetitions which form a homogenous background against 
which semantic distinctions are foregrounded.
In addition, Halliday and Hasan’s theory provides no effective 
way in which to distinguish the nature of reference cohesion from
lexical cohesion. Halliday and Hasan propose that reference is
distinguished from lexical cohesion because reference is 
grammatical. Yet, the authors group both reference and lexical
cohesion together by claiming they both result in cohesion because of
shared referents. In fact, they state the nature of these two
categories is not always easily distinguished (1976:279). However, 
the fundamental distinction between sense and reference within the 
field of semantics offers a method by which reference and lexical
cohesion can be distinguished. First, an analysis of current 
research on cohesion is presented. Second, a theory of cohesion as 
repetition based on perceptual theory is proposed. And, finally, a 
summary 1s included.
CURRENT THEORIES
The most important and comprehensive work on cohesion 1s 
unquestionably Halliday and Hasan’s Cohesion in English (1976). 
Halliday and Hasan define cohesion as a semantic phenomenon which
creates a text by linking elements of a discourse with each other.
First, I will present an overview of Halliday and Hasan’s
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categorization of cohesive devices along with other researchers’ 
attempts to expand or modify that categorization. Next, I will 
discuss problems with Halliday and Hasan’s theory which lie beyond 
the scope of their categories.
The Categories
Halliday and Hasan’s seminal work posits four major types of 
cohesion: reference, substitution/ellipsis, conjunction, and
lexical. Each of these is discussed below along with other related 
research.
Reference. Halliday and Hasan explain that some textual items 
indicate missing, presupposed referents, thereby creating a 
connection or tie within the text. They offer the following example 
of cohesion produced in this way.
(1) Doctor Foster went to Gloucester in a shower of 
rain. He stepped 1n a puddle right up to his 
middle and never went there again (1976:31).
In this example, the italicized words he and his presuppose the 
missing referent, Dr. Foster, while there presupposes the referent, 
Gloucester. In other words, the personal and demonstrative pronouns 
italicized in (1) are cohesive because they presuppose referents
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located elsewhere 1n the text.
Although Halliday and Hasan omit such elements as verb tense from 
their discussion, others have noted that tense 1s often used 
cohesively (e.g., Witte & Faigley 1981). I discuss this cohesive 
device here since both pronouns and tense are deictic 1n nature 
(i.e., devices for "pointing" in a discourse). For instance, 
consider the example below.
(2) He does not even think Surely Judith didn’t write
him about that letter or It was Clvtie who sent
him word somehow that Charles has written her 
(Faulkner 1936:353).
In (2) the italicized section of the sentence is cohesive partly
because the tense of both verbs (didn’t and was) is the same.
Substitution/El 1 jjaais. Halliday and Hasan also note that
connections can be made within a discourse by substituting or 
omitting certain items. For example, they offer the following 
example of cohesion produced through substitution.
(3) My axe is too blunt. I must get a sharper one
(1976:89).
In (3) the italicized word one presupposes and substitutes for axe.
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thus creating a cohesive tie between the two sentences. Halliday and 
Hasan claim that "reference is a relation on the semantic level, 
whereas substitution is a relation...of linguistic 'form’" 
(1976:89). Nevertheless, the authors argue that "the concept of 
cohesion is a semantic one" (1976:4). Thus, the authors distinguish 
between two of their categories by claiming that only one of them is 
semantic, but insist that all cohesion is semantic. Either the
authors are using the term semantic in two different senses or they 
contradict themselves. In either case, the nature of cohesion 
remains unclear. Are connections within a text semantic in nature or 
both semantic and formal? The authors themselves state that they are 
intentionally "excluding from consideration the effects of formal 
devices such as syntactic parallelism, metre and rhyme..." (1976:10), 
but if these formal devices are cohesive, then how can cohesion be a 
purely semantic phenomenon?
Halliday and Hasan offer the following example in order to argue 
that syntactic parallelism doesn’t produce a text.
(4) Although the light was on he went to sleep.
Although the house was unfurnished the rent was
very high. Although he was paid a high salary he 
refused to stay in the job (1976:20).
The authors explain, "this sort of grammatical parallelism is not
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irrelevant to Internal cohesion...but by itself it does not make a 
string of sentences into a text" (1976:20). Unfortunately, the 
authors do not explain how parallelism is relevant.
Although a number of researchers have followed Halliday and Hasan 
in defining cohesion as a purely semantic phenomenon (e.g., Bamberg 
1983, Tierney & Mosenthal 1983, and McCulley 1985), others have noted 
the importance of non-semantic sources of cohesion (Lybbert & 
Cummings 1969, Witte & Faigley 1981, Goodin 1982, and Markels 
1983). For example, Witte and Faigley note that cohesion is often
the result of syntactic parallelism and consistency in verb tense and 
point of view. Compare Lybbert and Cummings’ example of cohesion 
produced through syntactic parallelism in (5) with a revision in 
which no parallelism occurs in (5’) below.
(5) The aim of the Platonic philosophy was to exalt
man into God. The aim of the Baconian was to
provide him with what he required while he
continues to be a man (1969:36).
(5’) The aim of the Platonic philosophy was to exalt
man into God. To provide him with what he
required while he continues to be a man was what 
the philosophy of Bacon aimed to do.
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I would certainly contend that (5) 1s more cohesive than (5’); yet 
the only salient difference between the two is the order and 
configuration of their syntax. Syntactic parallelism obviously
produces cohesion. But neither Halliday and Hasan, Witte and 
Faigley, nor Lybbert and Cummings offer a theory of cohesion which 
accommodates both semantic and formal cohesive devices like 
parallel ism.
Markels argues that cohesion is both a syntactic and semantic 
phenomenon. However, she does not deal with parallelism. Instead, 
the author offers the following example to illustrate that Halliday 
and Hasan’s cohesive devices may occur without producing cohesion.
(6) John likes oranges. Oranges grow in California
and Florida. My parents visited California last
year (1983:451).
The author then argues that one key in producing cohesion is the 
concept of dominance. She explains that "dominance is attained not 
simply by repetitions of... [lexical items and their] pronoun 
substitutes, but by the consistent appearance of those repeated terms 
1n subject position" (1983:453). Markels’ claim, however, predicts 
that the example below will not display cohesion.
(6’) John likes oranges. Oranges grow 1n California
and Florida. My parents took John to California
last year and visited some orange groves.
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I would argue that (6’) exhibits more cohesion than (6); yet (6’) 
maintains the same group of subjects as (6). Thus, Markels’ theory 
cannot explain the relatively greater cohesion of (6’) compared to 
(6), and Halliday and Hasan’s theory cannot explain the lack of 
cohesion in (6),
In short, Halliday and Hasan claim that cohesion is a semantic 
phenomenon and exclude formal cohesive devices like syntactic 
parallelism, but include formal cohesion produced through 
substitution/ellipsis in their theory. While others have listed a 
variety of formal cohesive devices (e.g., parallelism, given-new 
arrangement, rhyme, verb tense, etc.), no one has offered a unifying 
theory of both semantic and formal cohesion.
Conjunctives. Halliday and Hasan also note that the use of 
conjunctives connects discourse elements. The authors explain that, 
unlike the other forms of cohesion which presuppose a missing item, 
conjunctives specify "the way in which what is to follow is 
systematically connected to what has gone before" (1976:227). They 
offer the following example of such cohesion.
(7) They fought a battle. Previously, it had snowed 
(1976:228).
In (7) the word previously presupposes a time relation between the 
propositions expressed by the two sentences, thus linking them with
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each other. As Halliday and Hasan note, conjunction creates a 
different kind of connection from the other cohesion categories since 
it is the very meaning of the conjunctive item that creates a 
connection, and no specific textual item (i.e., a referent or a word) 
is presupposed.
Lexical. Finally, Halliday and Hasan posit a category of 
lexical cohesion in which "the cohesive effect [is] achieved by the 
selection of vocabulary" (1976:274). Within this category, the 
authors posit two general classes of lexical cohesion: reiteration, 
including the use of (a) repetition of the same word, (b) synonyms, 
(c) superordinates, and (d) general words (e.g., place in (7) below), 
and ggilsglMsn- They give the following example of lexical 
cohesion.
(8) Can you tell me where to stay in Geneva? I’ve 
never been to the place (1976:275).
According to the authors, in (8) the italicized word place
presupposes the referent Geneva and thus creates a link between the 
two sentences. Unfortunately, Halliday and Hasan’s definition of the 
lexical category is problematic because we could argue that all their 
categories are the result of vocabulary selection. For example, 
choosing the word one to substitute for axe in example (3) above is a 
vocabulary selection. Likewise, choosing the word previously to
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connect the propositions expressed by example (7) above 1s a
vocabulary selection.
So how is this last category distinguished from the others?
Halliday and Hasan argue that reference and substitution/ellipsis, as 
well as conjunction (although to a lesser degree), are grouped 
together as grammatical, while the last category is lexical. Yet,
the authors group both reference and lexical cohesion together by
claiming they both result 1n cohesion because of shared referents. 
In fact, they state that "the boundary between lexical cohesion of 
the type we are calling REITERATION, and grammatical cohesion of the 
REFERENCE type, is by no means clearcut" (1976:279). Consider the 
following examples where the cohesive terms appear in italics.
(9) Jane loves volleyball. She likes to play every
day. [grammatical: reference]
(10) Jane loves volleyball. Jane likes to play every
day. [lexical:reiteration of same word]
(10’)Jane loves volleyball. The girl likes to play
every day. [lexical: reiteration of general noun]
(10” )Jane loves volleyball. Girls like to play every 
day. [lexical: collocation]
The use of she in (9) is cohesive because of its dependence on Jane 
for its interpretation (i.e., their common referent). However, the
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second occurrence of Jane in (10) might be construed as cohesive 
whether Jane refers to the same person or two different ones. In 
fact, the authors write that "reference is irrelevant to lexical
cohesion [involving the repetition of the same lexical item]"
(1976:284).
In addition, it seems reasonable to expect that the uses of both
girl in (10’) and girls in (10") would be cohesive for the same 
reason, especially since their usage is classified as lexical 
cohesion by Halliday and Hasan. Unfortunately, the referents of girl 
and gi rls are not the same. As Halliday and Hasan explain, "many 
instances of cohesion are purely lexical, a function simply of the 
co-occurrence of lexical items, and not in any way dependent on the 
relation of reference" (1976:283). In fact, they provide a list of 
the possible reference relations between lexical cohesive devices: 
identical, inclusive, exclusive or unrelated. Clearly, the nature of 
lexical cohesion cannot be understood by claiming that it depends on 
shared referents. But how then can its nature be understood? 
Unfortunately, Halliday and Hasan offer no other explanation besides 
the frequent co-occurrence of lexical items.
Halliday and Hasan comment about their other category of lexical
cohesion, collocation (e.g., in (10") above), "here we shall simply 
group together all the various lexical relations that do NOT depend 
on referential identity and are not of the form of reiteration...and 
treat it under the general heading of COLLOCATION" (1976:287). The
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authors themselves note that collocation 1s the most problematic part 
of lexical cohesion and that Its study is a major task for future 
research (1976:287).
Stotsky (1983) attempts to solve part of the problem with 
Halliday and Hasan’s lexical category by positing a revision of these 
cohesive devices based on an analysis of expository essays. She 
proposes that the class of reiteration describes a group of lexical 
cohesive devices which express systematic relationships; this class 
includes all of Halliday and Hasan’s types as well as antonyms 
(categorized under collocation by Halliday and Hasan) and derivatives 
(omitted by Halliday and Hasan). Consider the example below.
(11) June studies psychology at L.S.U. She plans to be 
a clinical psychologist when she graduates.
Note that psychologist is cohesive in (11) because it is a derivative 
of psychology, which occurs in the preceding sentence. Stostky’s 
inclusion of derivatives accounts for one type of cohesion not 
included in Halliday and Hasan’s theory. In addition, she proposes 
that the class of collocation describes a group of lexical cohesive 
devices which frequently co-occur, but express no systematic 
relationships. Consider the following example.
(12) Jack didn’t laugh because the .joke was so stupid.
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Is the use of .1oke and laugh 1n (12) cohesive? If these words 
frequently co-occur, shouldn’t we be able to discern some systematic 
relationship between them? Unfortunately, neither Stotsky nor 
Halliday and Hasan offer an explanation.
Hartnett (1986) also proposes a revision of cohesion categories 
in which cohesive devices are grouped according to their function: 
static or dynamic ties. The author explains that "cohesive ties vary 
in the kinds of mental processes they can express; many ties simply 
hold a reader’s attention on a topic [static ties], while others 
develop a topic rhetorically [dynamic ties]" (1986:142). For 
instance, consider the examples below.
(13) The dog was old and sick. And it died.
(13’)The dog was old and sick. Therefore it died.
Hartnett argues that the use of an additive conjunct like and creates 
a static tie between the two propositions expressed by the two 
sentences 1n (13), while the use of a causal conjunct like therefore 
creates a dynamic tie 1n (13’). In other words, and simply holds the 
reader’s attention in the discourse, while therefore signals a 
development in the discourse.
Hartnett classifies superordinates/hyponyms and temporal, causal, 
and adversative conjuncts as dynamic cohesive devices. And she 
groups parallel structure, tense, and the rest of Halliday and
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Hasan’s categories as static cohesive devices. Although Hartnett’s 
theory elucidates the function of both semantic and formal cohesive 
ties, she does not offer an explanation of the nature of cohesion 
except to propose that ties express mental processes. However, most 
of us assume that any use of language expresses mental processes, 
thereby limiting the utility of Hartnett’s theory for elucidating the 
nature of cohesion. Ideally, we should strive to understand the
nature of those mental processes which are specific to cohesion.
Other Complaints
A number of researchers have complained about the 
comprehensiveness of Halliday and Hasan’s theory because of their 
reliance on one fictional text for the majority of their examples. 
For instance, Johns writes that Halliday and Hasan's theory
requires further change, especially in the lexical 
category, where coding is especially difficult. 
Originally, most of the...coding was done on British 
literature...but items which appear [there]...are not 
those typical of modern business writing (1980:41).
Other researchers have also questioned the comprehensiveness of 
Halliday and Hasan’s theory (e.g., Stotsky 1983, Markels 1983, and
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Campbell 1n review).
Another group has questioned the explanatory power of Halliday 
and Hasan’s theory because it provides a quantitative measure of the 
cohesiveness of a text (e.g., Stotsky 1983, Tierney & Mosenthal 1983, 
and Hartnett 1986). For example, Hendricks states,
It takes Halliday and Hasan about seven pages to 
explain their scheme for coding the types of 
cohesion...And when one imagines the whole text of, 
say, Alice in Wonderland subjected to such an analysis, 
the result is bound to be a mass of data so 
overwhelming as to be practically useless (1988:104).
Consider the following example from Halliday and Hasan.
(14) Sometimes just being alone seems the bad thing.
Solitude can swell until it blocks the sun 
(1976:344).
According to Halliday and Hasan’s theory, the italicized words in
(14) are both used cohesively with being alone. Thing can be 
described as cohesive because it is a general word that depends for 
its referent on being alone: solitude 1s cohesive because it is a 
synonym of being alone. But what have we explained by noting that
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each sentence contains one lexical cohesive tie? With this short
example, the result of our cohesion analysis is not massive, but it
is less revealing than we might hope.
Another problem concerns the role of reader presuppositions and 
repetitions of textual elements in producing cohesion. A number of
researchers has argued for the importance of reader presuppositions
(e.g., Bellert 1970, Halliday & Hasan 1976, van Dijk 1980, Witte 
1981, and Hartnett 1986). However, Halliday and Hasan, along with 
Hartnett, argue for the importance of presuppositions in producing
cohesion, while the others focus on the importance of such 
presuppositions for producing coherence. In addition, early 
researchers argued for the importance of textual repetition (e.g., 
Lybbert & Cummings 1969 and Bellert 1970). However, Lybbert and 
Cummings focus on the importance of repetitions for producing 
cohesion, while Bellert focuses on the importance of repetitions for 
producing coherence.
As evidenced by the previous discussion of the role of reader
presuppositions and textual repetitions, an additional problem 
concerns the relationship of cohesion with coherence. While most 
researchers agree that the use of cohesive devices 1s a necessary but 
insufficient component of coherence (e.g., Halliday & Hasan 1976, van 
Dijk 1980, Bamberg 1983, McCulley 1985, and Tierney & Mosenthal 
1983), there appears to be little additional agreement about the
nature of the relationship between these two phenomena. For example,
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one researcher has found that only certain lexical categories of 
cohesion predicted coherence (McCulley 1985), while others have 
assumed the importance of all Halliday and Hasan’s categories for 
producing coherence (e.g., Bamberg 1983).
Although a number of studies have improved the comprehensiveness 
of cohesion theory by analyzing a variety of discourse genres as well 
as by proposing new and modified types of cohesive elements, I have 
discussed four general problems with current theories of cohesion in 
this section. First, no theory has convincingly defined the nature 
of lexical cohesion or distinguished the nature of this category from 
reference and conjunctive cohesion. Second, no theory has yet 
offered a convincing and revealing explanation of the nature of all 
cohesion, including both semantic and formal devices. Third, we do 
not currently understand the role of reader presuppositions and 
repetitions of textual elements for producing cohesion. And, fourth, 
we do not currently understand the nature of the relationship between 
cohesion and coherence. I hope to show, in the next section, that 
the use of an analogy with visual perception theory can elucidate 
some of these unknowns.
PERCEPTION AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Manning suggests that "we require a broader theory of 'effective 
representation’ (i.e., communication or rhetoric) in which writing
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can be compared to other forms of signification" (1988:242). His 
work on the relevance of visual perception and writing has provided 
an illuminating theory of the distinction between literary and 
technical discourse (1988). Specifically, Manning illustrates that 
"distinct types of line drawings replicate the literary/technical 
contrast in a visual medium" (1988:241). That contrast is due to the 
differences in the viewer/reader’s perceptions. Consider the 
following example, adapted from Manning’s article.
Imagine a drawing of a bird which is partly composed of several 
similar lines to create the illusion of feathers. This iterative 
detail "promotes the perception of actual physical appearance" 
(1988:252). In contrast, imagine a map which is partly composed of 
clearly distinct features (e.g., red lines for state highways and 
black lines for county roads). This detail "promotes
the perception of conceptual comparisons" (1988:252) not physical 
appearance. The viewer perceives the drawing as a substitute for 
the bird it represents, while s/he perceives the map as a standard 
by which the roads it represents can be understood. Manning argues 
that the most effective technical writing is perceived as a standard, 
predominated by contrastive detail, while the most effective 
literature is perceived as a substitute, predominated by iterative 
detail. Thus Manning establishes the relevance of models of visual 
perception to discourse analysis.1 Similarly, I argue here that 
the nature of cohesion and coherence can be better understood by
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analogy with models of visual perception. In this section, I will 
present a theory of cohesion based on such perception theory and 
provide an alternative categorization of cohesion types in order to 
address some of the problems with current classifications discussed 
in the previous section.
Cohesion as Repetition
Visual perception theory has long considered figure-ground
perception basic. In his classic book, Visual Thinking. Arnheim 
writes that perception
relies on the simple distinction between figure and 
ground: an object, defined and more or less structured,
is set off against a separate ground, which is
boundless, shapeless, homogeneous, secondary in 
importance, and often entirely ignored (1969:284).
To illustrate, consider the figure below.3
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Figure 1. Figure-Ground Perception
(A) XTKLPWXE (B) XXXXXXXX
MWIZKLSQ XXXXXXXX
PWEJVODF XXXXXOXX
RHCTUGBN XXXXXXXX
Note that, although the "0" in both (A) and (B) appears in the same 
row and column, it is significantly easier to perceive the "0" in (B) 
because the repetition of "X"s provides a homogeneous background
against which the ”0" 1s novel. As Broadbent, a major figure in
psychology, writes "any novel stimulus is especially likely to be 
perceived" (1958:106). In other words, the repeated elements are 
perceived as a uniform background which foregrounds the non-repeated 
elements.
I believe that the nature of cohesion can best be understood by 
analogy with figure-ground perception. Consider example (5) again,
repeated below.
(5) The aim of the Platonic philosophy was to exalt 
man into God. The aim of the Baconian was to
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provide him with what he required while he
continues to be a man (Lybbert & Cummings
1969:36).
Note again that the two sentences 1n (5) display parallel syntactic 
structure as illustrated by their parallel italicized portions. I 
believe the repetition of syntactic structure prompts our perception 
of cohesiveness in this example. In my view, both writers and 
readers use the repetition of elements as a background of similarity 
against which differences in meaning can be produced and perceived. 
In fact, as I mentioned in the previous section, other researchers 
have considered the importance of repetition for holding a text 
together. In fact, Lybbert and Cummings appear to perceive at least 
some discourse ties in much the same way as I have proposed in this 
repetition theory of cohesion; they write that syntactic "parallelism 
produces a symmetrical pattern that heightens the contrast" 
(1969:36). That contrast is between the syntax and both Platonic and 
Baconian in example (4) above. Unlike current theories which 
consider cohesion a semantic phenomenon, the repetition theory 
proposed here views cohesion as a general perceptual phenomenon and 
permits us to capture the nature of both formal and semantic cohesive 
elements.
Formal Cohesion. Types of formal cohesive devices would include:
(1) syntactic parallelism, (2) rhyme, alliteration, and meter, (3)
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thematic progression, (4) enumeration, and (5) typography. However, 
all formal cohesion is the result of repetitions of formal,
structural elements 1n a discourse. As one example, notice that 
£^E2a£jy2hy Can be used to further enhance the cohesiveness of (5) 
above.
(5” )The aim of the Platonic philosophy was to exalt 
man into God. The aim of the Baconian was to
provide him with what he required while he
continues to be a man.
In addition to cohesion produced through the use of the parallel 
syntax of (5), example (5” ) illustrates the use of boldface to 
further highlight the distinctive "figures" of Platonic and 
Baconian. In other words, the repetition of unenhanced typography 
forms a background against which the novel, boldface typography is 
distinguished. Although semantic distinctions are foregrounded by 
the use of this example’s parallel syntax and typography, it is 
largely the formal similarities (i.e., repetitive syntax and type)
which hold the sentences together.
Examples (5) and (5’’) illustrate the importance of recognizing 
that cohesion is not binary perception, which is either completely 
present in or completely absent from a discourse. Instead, we appear 
to perceive degrees of cohesion. Both discourses are cohesive, but
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(5” ) illustrates an additional type of cohesive element compared to 
(5). Future experimental research might continue to investigate the 
optimum number or type of cohesive elements for producing cohesion in 
a text.
As another example, consider the use of enumeration 1n the 
excerpt below quoted by Journet and Kling from a nursing dictionary.
(15) The malignant cells may spread to other parts of 
the body by (1) direct extension into adjacent 
tissue, (2) permeation along lymphatic vessels,
(3) traveling 1n the lymph stream to the lymph 
nodes...(1984:17).
Note that each description of spreading in (15) is numbered. The 
repetition of this enumeration creates a background of similarity 
among the three descriptions, thus producing a link among them. 
Their similar background, in turn, foregrounds the semantic
distinctions among them.
Since Halliday and Hasan Illustrate that their category of 
substitution/ellipsis creates ties between "formal" discourse 
elements of the same syntactic class, these cohesive devices would 
also fall within the general category of formal cohesion. Consider 
the example of cohesion produced through ellipsis below.
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(16) What were they doing? - Holding hands (Halliday 
and Hasan 1976:198).
Note that the answer holding hands presupposes the complete They were 
holding hands. Thus, the omitted structural elements of subject and 
verb are found in the previous sentence, creating a formal link 
between the sentences. Although the formal elements of subject and 
verb are not explicitly repeated in (16), we can assume that they are
repeated in the mind of the listener/reader 1n order to interpret the
incomplete structure of the second sentence; again, the repetition 
creates a background of similarity.
Earlier, I used the following example of Halliday and Hasan’s to 
exemplify cohesiveness achieved through substitution.
(3) Hy axe is too blunt. I must get a sharper one
(1976:89).
The authors classify the cohesion in (3) as nominal substitution 
where one substitutes for axe- They state that "a substitute [like 
one in (3)] is a sort of counter which 1s used in place of the
repetition of a particular Item" (1976:89). In my view, the use of 
one here is cohesive because it is interpreted as a repetition of axe
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and thus provides a similar background for Interpreting the semantic 
component of the sentences. Unfortunately, there are a couple of 
problems with categorizing substitution: (a) 1t is sufficiently
similar to ellipsis to warrant their inclusion in the same category 
since they both describe the replacement of one item in a text by 
another of equivalent grammatical category; (b) it is sufficiently 
similar to reference to warrant their inclusion in the same category 
since both describe the use of lexical items which depend on other 
lexical items 1n the discourse for their referents (e.g., ft and 
one). Substitution then appears to lie somewhere in the middle of
the continuum between formal and semantic cohesive devices.
Although there are no doubt a variety of additional cohesive 
devices which result from the repetition of formal discourse elements 
(e.g. thematic progression and rhyme), space prohibits their 
inclusion in this paper. Instead, future studies might investigate 
the utility of the repetition theory of cohesion presented here for
describing other formal cohesive devices.
Semantic Cohesion. Now let’s turn to the relevance of the
repetition theory for semantic cohesive elements. Halliday and
Hasan’s reference and lexical categories would be included here.
Semantic cohesion can be distinguished from formal cohesion by the
semantic nature of the elements which are repeated to create ties 
within a discourse. The following example from Halliday and Hasan
was used above to exemplify cohesion produced through pronominal
reference.
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(1) Doctor Foster went to Gloucester In a shower of 
rain. He stepped in a puddle right up to his 
middle and never went there again (1976:31).
I noted then that he, his and there are consider to be cohesive 
because they presuppose referents located elsewhere in the text. In 
my view, it 1s the of reference that is salient in
producing our perception of cohesion since that repetition provides a 
homogenous background against which semantic distinctions can be 
made.
I noted earlier that Witte and Faigley (1981) have observed the 
importance of consistent verb tense for producing cohesion. I 
included the following example of such cohesion.
(2) He does not even think Surely Judith didn’t write 
him about that letter or It was Clvtie who sent 
him word somehow that Charles has written her 
(Faulkn*f 1936:353).
Note that it is the repetition of the same tense that holds the 
italicized portion of this sentence together. In addition, it is 
this similar background, which highlights the distinction between the
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Italicized section of the sentence and the section which contains a 
present tense verb (I.e., does).
In the section on current theories of cohesion, I attempted to 
Illustrate the inadequacy of these theories for distinguishing
referential cohesion from lexical. In fact, there is a fairly simply 
way in which to make that distinction if we rely on the established 
practice within the field of semantics of differentiating reference 
from sense. The classic example used to Illustrate this distinction 
appears below and 1s attributed to Frege .
(17) The morning star is the evening star.
Simply put, although morning star and evening star have the same 
referent, they obviously have different senses. Thus, each lexical 
item has both a deictic and a sense component. I am proposing that 
there is a distinction between the ties created by each of these
components.
I used the following examples to illustrate the inadequacy of 
Halliday and Hasan’s explanation of the nature of semantic cohesion 
(their categories of reference and lexical cohesion).
(9) Jane loves volleyball. She likes to play every
day,
(10) Jane loves volleyball. Jane Hkes to play every
day.
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(10’)Jane loves volleyball. The girl Hkes to play 
every day.
(10” )Jane loves volleyball. Girls like to play every 
day.
In both my view and HalHday and Hasan’s, the use of she 1n (9) is 
cohesive because of Its common referent Jane in the first sentence. 
However, HalHday and Hasan offer no explanation for the cohesion of 
the second occurrence of Jane in (10), although they note that
reference is Irrelevant in cases where Identical lexical repetition. 
Within the repetition theory proposed here, such cases may be 
construed as cohesive for any or all of the following reasons: (a) 
the repetition of visual form, (b) the repetition of semantic
referent, and (c) the repetition of semantic sense.
I also argued earlier that HalHday and Hasan’s explanation of 
the cohesion in (10’) and (10” ) is not ideal; their theory claims 
that, while the cohesion produced in (10’) and (10” ) is similarly 
due to vocabulary, (10’) is due to the common referent of Jane and 
girl while (10” ) is simply due to frequent co-occurrence of Jane and 
girl. In contrast, the repetition theory presented here captures the 
similarity and difference between the cohesion in these two examples 
more clearly and accurately. Specifically, In both examples, the 
sense of girl is repeated, while in (10’) the deictic the presupposes 
the repetition of the referent of girl and Jane in addition.
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(Although Halllday and Hasan note the cohesive properties of the 
definite article the, their theory does not explain the similarity in 
cohesion between examples such as these.)
Since verb tense and other highly deictic words (e.g., the or 
above) as well as pronomlnals can be used cohesively it seems 
appropriate to divide semantic cohesion into that which is primarily 
accomplished through deixis (e.g., she in (9) above) and that which 
is primarily accomplished through sense (e.g., girl in (10” ) above).
In order to be more accurate in describing cohesion produced 
through the repetition of a word’s sense, consider the examples from 
Halliday and Hasan below.
(18) I turned to the ascent of the peak. The ascent 
was perfectly easy (1976:279).
(18’)I turned to the ascent of the peak. The climb was 
perfectly easy.
(18”  )I turned to the ascent of the peak. The task was 
perfectly easy (1976:279).
In these cases, the authors themselves note that the examples (of 
their category called, appropriately, reiteration) are cohesive 
because of repetition. However, Halllday and Hasan claim that it is 
the repetition of a referent that is cohesive. I have proposed that
Chapter Four - 121
both the repetition of reference and the repetition of sense produces 
cohesion in such examples. To be more specific, I propose that 
semantic features are repeated. Semantic feature theory represents 
the sense of a word by prime binary features. For example, the sense 
of the word boy could be represented by the features [+male] and 
[-adult], while the sense of the word man could be represented by the 
features [+male] and [+adult]. In this way, the theory explains the 
relative "distance" among words by positing a difference in semantic 
features. For example, a difference 1n just one value [adult] for 
boy and man but for two values [adult] and [male] for man and girl 
captures the observation that man is more closely related to boy than 
Sir]..3
Although the complete set of semantic features for a word may be 
difficult to agree upon, this theory is useful for understanding the
nature of examples such as those above. For example, in (18*) the
words ascent and cl1mb would both contain at least the features 
[+vo!1t1onalJ and [+motion]. The repetition of these features is one 
cause of the cohesiveness of these sentences. Likewise, 1n (18” ) 
the words ascent and task would share at least the feature
[+vol1tional]. My view of cohesion as repetition of semantic
features 1n these two examples predicts that (18’) will be perceived 
as more cohesive than (18” ) because of the degree to which the word 
pairs share features. It would be interesting to see whether future 
research substantiates that prediction.
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Halliday and Hasan claim that the use of antonyms (within their 
category of collocation) produces cohesion because of the words’ 
frequent co-occurrence. The authors claim that such cohesion "is 
achieved through the association of lexical items that regularly 
co-occur" (1976:284), and that "the analysis and Interpretation of 
lexical patterning of this kind is a major task 1n the further study 
of textual cohesion" (1976:285). The authors offer the following 
example of this type of cohesion.
(19) Why does this little boy wriggle all the time?
Girls don’t wriggle (1976:285).
Unfortunately, however, the authors offer no real explanation of why 
the use of antonyms such as those in (19) is cohesive. In contrast, 
if we propose that all cohesion is the result of repetition and, 
specifically, that some semantic cohesion is the result of feature 
repetition, we can note that girl and boy are cohesive because at 
least the features [+human] and [-adult] are repeated.
CONCLUSIONS
Although representative only, I envision a classification of 
cohesion based on earlier work and the repetition theory presented in 
the last section which is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Classes of Cohesive Elements
COHESION
FORMAL
LINGUISTIC GRAPHIC
rhyme typography
parallelism charts
substitution
SEMANTIC
DEICTIC SENSE
reference antonymy
tense hyponymy
point of view synonymy
With the repetition theory of cohesion presented in the last 
section, we have come a long way in solving the problems posed at the 
end of the section on current theories. First, repetition theory 
offers a revealing explanation of the nature of all cohesion, 
including v both semantic and formal devices. I argued that models of 
the visual perception of figure-ground relations are analogous to our 
perception of cohesion in discourse. Specifically, repetitions of 
formal and semantic elements provide a kind of homogenous background 
against which novel semantic distinctions are foregrounded. Second, 
repetition theory distinguishes the nature of Halliday and Hasan’s
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categories of reference and lexical cohesion by proposing that
lexical items can produce ties with either their deictic or sense
components (or both). And, third, repetition theory explains the 
relevance of repetitions of discourse elements for producing
cohesion.
However, some of those earlier questions remain: How can we
distinguish between the kind of connections made by using semantic 
cohesive devices and conjunctives? What is the role of reader 
presuppositions in making a text? These questions require a theory 
of coherence which can effectively distinguish cohesion and
coherence. Again, future research might benefit from using models of 
visual perception to answer these questions.
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NOTES
iSpace prohibits anything but a brief description of Manning’s 
work. The reader should consult his article for a more skillful and 
comprehensive presentation.
2I am grateful to Frank Parker for providing this figure.
3For a more detailed explanation of semantic feature theory see 
Lyons (1977).
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INTRODUCTION
In their seminal work, Cohesion 1n English. Halliday and Hasan
(1976) argue that cohesion 1s a non-structural, semantic relation.
Indeed, cohesion studies of texts using Halllday and Hasan’s scheme 
have proliferated since Its publication (e.g., Johns 1980, Witte & 
Falgley 1981, Goodin & Perkins 1982, Fahnestock 1983, Markels 1983,
Stotsky 1983, Tierney & Mosenthal 1983, Frawley & Smith 1985,
McCulley 1985, and Hartnett 1986). Moreover, Witte and Falgley write
that "because Cohesion 1n English 1s a pioneering effort to describe
relationships between and among sentences 1n text, we anticipate that 
cohesion will be studied in future research addressing the linguistic 
features of written texts'* (1981:190). However, Stotsky notes that
Halliday and Hasan’s scheme must be modified to accurately represent
cohesion in expository essays. Likewise, in her study of cohesion in 
business writing, Johns writes that the theory “requires further 
change...[because] most of the Halllday and Hasan coding was done on 
British literature, especially Alice 1n Wonderland: ...Items which 
appear 1n Lewis Carroll’s writing are not those typical of modern 
business writing" (1980:41). Unfortunately, there has been little 
substantive addition to the theory of cohesion set forth by Halliday 
and Hasan thirteen years ago, despite its "pioneering" nature.
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In this paper, I want to suggest that cohesion may be better 
understood as a general perceptual phenomenon Instead of a purely 
semantic one. Specifically, I will propose that cohesion Is the 
result of repeating semantic and structural elements. This 
repetition, in turn, appears to provide a uniform background against 
which semantic distinctions are foregrounded (much the same as 
repeated visual patterns form a background against which visual 
distinctions are foregrounded). Most importantly here, I want to
argue that Halliday and Hasan’s scheme for coding cohesive devices 1s 
descriptively Inadequate because of the authors’ claim that cohesive 
relations are semantic, not structural. I believe their exclusion of 
structural cohesion results directly from their use of a fictional 
text in formulating their theory. In fact, there appear to be a
number of structural (hereafter, formal) cohesive relations in 
texts. My main purpose here, then, is to substantiate the occurrence 
of these formal cohesive devices by analyzing a wide variety of 
professionally written, non-flctional texts.
To this end, I will first discuss the limitations of Halllday and 
Hasan’s theory of cohesion. Second, I will briefly outline an 
alternative view of cohesion as a general perceptual phenomenon. 
And, third, I will present examples of formal cohesion produced 
through (1) thematic progression, (2) syntactic parallelism and (3) 
graphic devices (including the use of typography, enumeration and 
charts).
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HALLIDAY AND HASAN’S THEORY OF COHESION
In Cohesion in English. Halllday and Hasan argue that cohesive 
relations are semantic. The authors state that cohesion "1s achieved 
through relations in MEANING..." (1976:10), and they posit four major 
categories of cohesive devices: reference, substitution/ellipsis,
conjunction and lexical. Halliday and Hasan state that they are 
"excluding from consideration the effects of formal devices such as 
syntactic parallelism, metre and rhyme..." (1976:10) Similarly, 
Halliday and Hasan omit Functional Sentence Perspective (FSP) from 
their categories of cohesion because FSP is structurally produced. 
In short, Halllday and Hasan define cohesion as a semantic phenomenon 
despite recognizing that some cohesive devices are formal, not 
semantic. In contrast, other researchers have noted the importance 
of parallelism (e.g., Witte & Falgley 1981:199) and FSP (e.g., Goodin 
& Perkins 1982:59) in explaining cohesion and coherence.
In fact, Halliday and Hasan show some ambivalence about their 
choice to omit formal devices from their discussion. For instance, 
the authors Indicate the Importance of formal devices in cohesion by 
noting that "cohesive relations are real1zed...by the selection of 
structures, and of lexical items in structural roles" (1976:303). In 
addition, the authors use a syntactic distinction to explain the 
difference between two of their categories: substitution and
reference. Specifically, they state that "substitution is a relation
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1n wording rather than 1n the meaning" (1976:88). Moreover, their 
terminology for subcategories of substitution/ellipsis (which are 
"nominal, verbal and clausal") suggest that the authors see this 
category of cohesion as syntactic and therefore FORMAL.
While choosing to limit the scope of Cohesion 1n English to 
semantic cohesion is in itself fairly unremarkable, the fact that 
analysts of written texts have continued for 13 years to use Halliday 
and Hasan’s theory of cohesion without substantial addition is 
remarkable. I noted that Witte and Faigley (1981) expected future 
research to modify Halllday and Hasan’s scheme since it was a 
“pioneering" effort. Unfortunately, there has been a dearth of such 
research. Markels (1983) provides one exception in arguing that 
cohesion is both semantic and syntactic. Stotsky (1983) also 
provides an exception in arguing for a modification of the category 
of lexical cohesion. And Hartnett (1986) provides one other 
exception in positing a distinction between static and dynamic 
cohesive devices. However, despite the need for this kind of 
research, Markels’ paper proposes only one new category of cohesion 
(syntactic). And both Stotsky and Hartnett modify Halllday and 
Hasan’s original categories. In essence, no research has established 
the range of formal cohesive devices available to writers.
Another related limitation of Halliday and Hasan’s theory 
concerns their almost complete reliance on an analysis of one 
fictional, narrative text. Most cohesion studies, in contrast, have
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investigated cohesion in non-fictional texts. Some research has 
illustrated linguistic differences 1n the use of cohesive devices 
among written genres even within Halliday and Hasan’s categories. 
For example, the use of intratextual reference as a cohesive device 
is much more common in fiction than in scientific writing (Frawley & 
Smith 1985). Similarly, the types of lexical cohesion found in 
expository essays are different from those found in the fictional 
text used by Halliday and Hasan (Stotsky 1983). In addition, there 
are marked differences 1n the distribution of referential and lexical 
cohesive ties even within a genre: for instance, among letters,
reports and business textbooks (Johns 1980:40). Thus, Halliday and 
Hasan’s theory of cohesion may not adequately represent the types of 
cohesive devices found In non-fictional discourses.
In order to supplement Halliday and Hasan’s original theory of 
cohesion, I will Illustrate here that three types of FORMAL cohesive 
devices commonly occur in non-fictional texts. Like Meyer, I
believe that "the exploration of the regularities of technical 
discourse plays an essential part in the development of a theory of 
coherence" (1987:8). Therefore, I have analyzed texts which were 
professionally written and collected for publication in a reader for 
technical writers (Journet & Kling 1984). By choosing the texts in a 
reader, I have tried to Insure that the analyzed texts (a) included 
written texts of many types (e.g., budget review memos, encyclopedia 
descriptions, recipes, financial reports, etc.); (b) were "naturally"
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written by professional writers 1n a range of settings (e.g., the 
large U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, the small Ken Cook Co., 
the private Philips Corporation, etc.); and (c) were representative 
of the variety of purposes and audiences for which professionals 
write (e.g., descriptions for the novice public, instructions for the 
consumer, funding requests for government agencies, etc.).
FORMAL COHESION
Before offering examples of FORMAL cohesion in this section, a 
few, general words about the nature of cohesion will be included. 
Like Halliday and Hasan, I agree that MEANING is involved in cohesive 
relations. However, it may be helpful to modify their definition (in 
which cohesion is the linguistic result of purely SEMANTIC ties) in 
order to understand cohesion more clearly. In his article 
establishing the relevance of perceptual phenomena to the study of 
discourse, Manning writes that "a clear perception of differences 
demands a common background of similarity against which differences 
may stand out" (1988:244). To illustrate, find the "0" in each of 
the figures below.
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Figure 1
(1) XTKLPWXE 
MWIZKLSQ 
PWEJVODF 
RHCTUGBN
(2) XXXXXXXX 
XXXXXXXX 
XXXXXOXX 
XXXXXXXX
Although each "0“ appears 1n the same row and column of each figure, 
1t 1s significantly easier to locate the "0" 1n (2) because the 
repetition of X ’s provides a uniform background against which the "0" 
1s distinctive. In an early study of cohesion, Bellert noted that 
part of “the coherence of a text consists, roughly speaking, 1n 
repetitions" (1970:336). I want to suggest that textual cohesion 
(both written and oral) 1s analogous to the perceptual phenomenon 
Illustrated by the X ’s 1n (2). In my view, both writers and readers 
use the repetition of elements as a background of similarity against 
which differences 1n meaning can be produced and perceived. In fact, 
my view 1s similar to previous accounts. For Instance, Lybbert and 
Cummings write that syntactic "parallelism produces a symmetrical 
pattern that heightens the contrast" (1969:36). Briefly then,
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cohesion is the result of repetition.
For the sake of brevity, a full discussion of this view of 
cohesion cannot be offered here, but constitutes a separate paper 
(See Campbell under review). Instead, I want to concentrate 1n this 
paper on supplementing Halliday and Hasan’s original categories of 
cohesive devices by substantiating the use of FORMAL repetition as a 
cohesive device. It 1s Important to note that semantic relations 
will necessarily be Involved in any formal cohesive relations. 
Nevertheless, I will discuss only formal cohesion here for the sake 
of explication.
In the remainder of this paper, I will present examples of three 
types of formal cohesive devices: (1) thematic progression, (2)
and (3) graphic (jevices (including 
typography, enumeration and charts).
Thematic Progression
In this section, I will describe one formal cohesive device which 
1s called thematic progression. The elements which are repeated in 
thematic progression are Information units. Specifically, they are 
called topics (I.e., given/old information) and comments (I.e., new 
information). To understand thematic progression, the notion of 
Functional Sentence Perspective (FSP) must be explained. Both of 
these concepts rise out of the work of the Prague School Linguists,
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especially Mathesius. (See Danes (1974) for a complete treatment of 
these concepts.) FSP describes the placement of topics near the 
beginning of sentences and of comments after topics. For example, 
consider the following excerpt from the first paragraph of Philips 
Corporation’s specifications for a word processor:
(1) The PHILIPS 2001 is a modular, high performance,
standalone word processing system...[emphasis added] 
(Journet & KUng 1984:56).
The topic of this sentence (i.e., "the PHILIPS 2001") appears in
boldface. Note that even the topic of the first sentence of a text 
can be interpreted as "old" information and, in addition, that it
precedes any comment or "new" information. This placement of topic 
before comment apparently makes it easier for readers to comprehend 
sentences (Clark & Havlland 1977).
As another example of the placement of topics and comments within 
sentences, consider the following partial description written for 
meteorologists below:
(2) Virna ag£i_fiff££ts of wind shear are not prominent.
A cloud composed of many units may or may not cover
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the entire field of view from the ground.
content 1s highly variable...[emphasis added] (Journet
& Kling 1984:51).
Note that the topic of each sentence 1n (2) appears in boldface. 
Most of us are meteorological novices and cannot consider these 
topics as truly "old" Information. Nevertheless, most of us can 
probably pick out the topics of these sentences because in English, 
as in most of the world’s languages, it is very common for the topic 
of a sentence to occur 1n initial position. Excerpt (2) illustrates 
that the categorization of information as "old” or "new" may depend 
on the knowledge of the writer and reader.
Thematic progression 1s a formal cohesive device because it
describes the two most common patterns by which sentences are linked 
through the repetition of topics and comments. Thematic progression 
then refers to the progression from the topic of one sentence to the 
topic of another. For instance, consider the sentences 1n the 
following excerpt which appears within a financial analysis of
Service Corporation International (SCI):
(3) As structured, ££! traded the property...for $11.0
million of its common stock and incurred no tax
liability on the property’s appreciation...^! did 
give American General a concession...SCI will 
continue to lease the property from American General
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for two years at an annual rate of $150,000." [emphasis 
added] (Journet & KUng 1984:213).
The topic 1n each sentence appears 1n boldface. In this example, 
note that the topic “SCI" remains the same in each sentence, while 
the comments vary. The type of thematic progression represented in 
(3) is often referred to as AB-AC. In other words, the topic of each 
sentence (A) in AB-AC progression remains the same, while the 
comments (B and C) add new information about that same topic.
The sentences in (4) below, which describe one objective from
within a government grant application, exhibit another form of
thematic progression:
(4) Interpret the resulting information and formulate a
Recoverv__P1an. This plan will include designations 
of Critical Habitat and will outline steps to be
taken...[emphasis added] (Journet & Kling 1984:162).
Note 1n (4) that the topic of the second sentence (i.e., "this 
filin") and part of a comment on the first sentence (i.e., "a
Recovery Plan") appear in boldface. In this example then, plan is 
repeated as the comment of the first sentence and the topic of the 
second. The type of progression illustrated here is often called 
AB-BC. In other words, the topics do not remain the same in this
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pattern; Instead, the comment (B) of one sentence becomes the topic 
(B) of the next sentence.
The following excerpt from a description of a wastewater 
treatment process also exhibits AB-BC progression:
(5) Celanese has two other plants currently under 
construction at £j]en|j£iy__B;l£Q£s=_ y ^
Texas. TheBlshop system 1s designed to remove 80% 
of a 75,000lb/day load... [emphasis added] (Journet &
Kling 1984:62).
Note that the comment (I.e., "plants 1n...Bishop") of the first 
sentence in (5) appears as the topic (i.e., "the Bishop system") of 
the passivized second sentence. The passive construction is often a 
useful tool for producing effective patterns of thematic progression.
The final example of cohesion produced through thematic
progression is taken from a proposal for conducting a market 
feasibility analysis:
(6) We are prepared to conduct this market feasibility 
analysis for a fee of $12,000 plus dicS£L_£2St§- 
fij£|£lL_£jes£S Include transporation [sic], lodging per 
diem, telecommunications, and report production, ye 
will provide five copies of a fully documented report
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within six weeks of receiving your authorization to 
proceed [emphasis added]. (Journet & KUng 1984:149)
Note that this example Illustrates both an AB-AC and an AB-BC 
progression. Specifically, the topic of the first sentence (i.e., 
"we") occurs again as the topic of the third sentence (AB-AC), while 
the comment of the first sentence (I.e., "direct costs") appears as 
the topic of the second sentence (AB-BC).
At this point, it may be instructive to consider the effect on 
cohesion when these patterns of thematic progression are violated. 
For example, the paragraph below 1s adapted from (6) above.
(6’) This market feasibility analysis will be conducted for 
a fee of $12,000 plus direct costs. Transportation, 
lodging per diem, telecommunications, and report 
production will be included 1n direct costs. Within 
six weeks of receiving your authorization to proceed, 
you will receive five copies of a fully documented 
report.
While the sentences in (6’) are certainly Interpretable, there is no 
question that (6) above is more cohesive because of Its "preferred" 
arrangement of topics and comments (I.e., its use of the patterns of 
thematic progression discussed here).
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In this section, I have described one way 1n which formal
cohesion 1s produced; namely through the repetition of Information
units called topics and comments. Thematic progression results In 
the repetition of topics and comments among sentences. The 
repetition of these Information units provides a uniform background 
of similarity in form against which readers may more easily focus on 
distinctions 1n meaning between sentences.
Syntactic Parallelism
Syntactic parallelism 1s a formal cohesive device because 1t 
describes the way 1n which syntactic structure may be repeated 1n 
order to create a link between semantic elements. For example, the 
following excerpt 1s taken from a description of oil shale processing 
written by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment:
(7) The alternative approaches are:
* TIS prwesses 1n which the shale 1s left 
underground...
* MIS processes 1n whlcha portion of the shale 
d|E2§iJL_i3 mined out...
* AGR processes 1n whMl_fct]5_siialfi—Ls mined...
(Journet & KUng 1984:66).
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Note that each of the clauses 1n (7) has roughly the form X processes 
in which shale 1s V. In other words, each clause consists of a head 
noun followed by a restrictive relative clause. In Lybbert and 
Cummings words, the formal, "symmetrical pattern heightens the 
contrast" (1969).
Another example of parallelism occurs 1n the following excerpt 
from a description of a data base written by IBM:
(8) If you___gjiange a segment that the program Isn't 
gensiiJvs__fcaJ— jt doesn’t affectJbhe_Drogram. In the 
same way, If vou change a field that the program 
isn't igngiliy.6 to. iX-Jjoesni£_affgct the program 
(Journet & KUng 1984:75).
Note that the two sentences in (8) have roughly the form If vou 
change X. then Y . In brief, each sentence begins with a conditional 
clause. Again, the repetition of this syntactic form provides a 
uniform background which foregrounds semantic differences.
Parallelism need not occur only within adjacent sentences as 
above, but 1s frequent among headings, also. For example, the 
following list of headings is taken from a brochure written to 
explain how to plan and manage a product support program:
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(9) HOW CAN YOU MANAGE A TOTAL PROGRAM?
HOW CAN YOU SCHEDULE A TOTAL PROGRAM?
HOW CAN YOU STAFF FOR A TOTAL PROGRAM?
(Journet & KUng 1984:121)
Note that each heading has roughly the form How can vou X a total 
program. Specifically, the interrogative form is used in each
heading.
Parallelism can produce cohesive ties between prose in different 
sections of a text as well. For example, the following excerpts are 
taken from an internal budget review report at Lexington Public Power 
Supply System:
(10) I. DETAILED PLANNING AND BUDGET REVIEWS
EU;geg|g;j___:_:;l2 (a) further develop the Supply
System, (b) improve Integrity of the budgets...
II. JOINT REVIEW OF PROGRAMS BY DIRECTORS— APRIL 14
Purpose: To review the current status and
results of the 1982 A&G planning and budget 
process...
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III. SENIOR MANAGEMENT REVIEWS— APRIL 29-30
£y£E2SfiI_:_!fi present organizational budgets to 
the Managing Olrector for review and approval...
(Journet & Kling 1984:174-6).
Note that under each of the three headings in (10) the description of 
the purpose of each review session takes the form To X . In other 
words, each statement of purpose begins by repeating the infinitive 
verb-form.
Any syntactic structure may be repeated in order to create 
cohesion. For Instance, an engineering journal contains the
following excerpt:
(11) Things mechanics do not like to see in manuals:
*Copies of photos or blueprints. A poor picture 
or print cannot be made better on any copier. 
*|£££QjLi^§__=^ | §  Of decimal numbers for page, 
chapter, or paragraph identification...
of sketches and drawings 
vertically on the page, requiring the rotation of 
the book or person to read 1t...
(Journet & Kling 1984:124)
Note that each statement in (11) begins with a noun phrase.
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Again, 1t may be useful at this point to consider the effect on 
cohesion when parallel syntax 1s not used. The example below 1s 
adapted from (11) above.
(11’)Th1ngs mechanics do not like to see 1n manuals:
*Don’t use copies of photos or blueprints. A poor 
picture or print cannot be made better on any 
copier.
*When decimal numbers are extensively used to 
Identify page, chapter, or paragraph, 1t can be 
confusing.
*Would you present sketches and drawings 
horizontally, instead of vertically, on the page 
so that the book or person can read 1t more 
eas1ly?
The various syntactic forms used 1n listing mechanics’ dislikes in 
(11’) are considerably less cohesive than the repeated, parallel 
forms used 1n (11).
In this section, I have described formal cohesion in some varied 
Instances of syntactic parallelism (i.e., where a syntactic structure 
is repeated). This repetition of form provides a uniform background 
against which the semantic differences in a text are foregrounded and 
therefore more easily perceived.
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Graphic Repetition
In this section, I want to Illustrate some varieties of graphic 
cohesion found 1n written texts. Like Waller, I believe in the 
necessity of "including typographic and spatial factors in the 
linguistic analysis of complex text" (1980:252). Likewise, Reich and 
Cherry state "the derivation of meaning from a text is a complex task 
which can benefit from graphic as well as purely linguistic 
information" (1979:376). In fact, experiments have shown that there 
is much disagreement among subjects concerning which words are the 
key concepts in a text without the use of typographical cuing (Foster 
1979:197). Graphic cohesive devices, then, help to limit the 
possible meanings of a text. And, since the perception of only one, 
intended meaning appears to define effective technical discourse but 
ineffective literature (Manning 1988), no researcher would find many 
examples of graphic cohesion in Halliday and Hasan’s great, fictional 
text. I will discuss three types of graphic devices here:
typography, enumeration, and charts. In each case, the repetition of 
some visual element creates cohesion.
I^EgaQLEhY" Typography 1s a formal cohesive device when 
typographic features are repeated, producing a uniform background 
against which semantic differences are foregrounded and therefore 
easily perceived. For example, the following excerpt comes from the
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description of a data base for computer programmers:
(12) An accounting program that calculates and prints 
bills for the clinic’s patients would need only 
the PATIENT, BILLING, and PAYMENT segments 
[Journet & Kling 1984:74].
Note that three words in (12) appear in all capital letters. These 
words name "places" in the data base. The repeated use of 
typographical features creates a formal link between these three 
words. So the repetition foregrounds the semantic distinction 
between the "places" and other semantic referents (e.g., "PATIENTS" 
and "patients").
Typographic cohesion can be produced within a variety of textual 
settings other than the sentence, as above. For instance, the Armed 
Forces’ recipe for beef stew contains the following column headings:
(13) INGREDIENTS 
WEIGHTS 
MEASURES 
METHOD
[Journet & Kling 1984:91]
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Note that each of the column headings in (13) appears 1n all capital 
letters. The cohesive effect of this typographic repetition is 
Identical to that in (12) above.
As a final example of typographic cohesion, consider the 
following 11st of headings taken from a financial analysis of a group 
of funeral homes:
(14) _Xhg_JLBgystry 
T h e  C o m p a n y  
Principal Business 
Company Structure 
Funeral Homes 
Cemeteries 
Flower Shops
[Journet & Kling 1984:207-210]
Note that the headings in (14) vary a number of typographic 
qualities: type size, boldface and italics. The repetition of
boldface and the largest type size denotes "equivalent" headings 
(I.e., "The Industry" and "The Company"). Likewise, the repetition 
of Italics and medium type size denote equivalent headings (i.e., 
"Principal Business" and "Company Structure"). In each case, the
repetition of typographic features aids in distinguishing between a
group of equivalent headings and any other group.
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Consider the effect on cohesion when these typographic devices 
are not used 1n the example below which 1s adapted from (14).
(14’) The Industry 
The Company 
Principal Business 
Company Structure 
Funeral Homes 
Cemeteries 
Flower Shops
In this list of headings, only "regular" typography is used, and 
therefore the semantic distinctions among headings are not 
foregrounded through the use of a repetitive background.
£QyjjjgOiil2Q. Enumeration is a graphic cohesive device when 
enumerating elements are repeated, again creating a background which 
highlights semantic differences. For instance, the excerpt below is 
taken from a nursing dictionary:
(15) The malignant cells may spread to other parts of 
the body by (1) direct extension Into adjacent 
tissue, (2) permeation along lymphatic vessels,
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(3) traveling 1n the lymph stream to the lymph 
nodes...[Journet & Kling 1984:17].
Note that each description of spreading in (15) 1s numbered so that 
each 1s similar at one level (I.e., they each describe spreading) and 
dissimilar at another level (I.e., they each describe different types 
of spreading). The repetition of formal elements again provides a 
uniform background which highlights semantic differences between the 
kinds of spreading.
Enumeration often Involves elements other than numbers. For 
example, consider the excerpt below from a progress report:
(16) Summary of Activities That Are Behind Schedule
a. Installation of baghouse test module.
b. Relocation of construction facilities.
c. Bid package for Unit 5 precipitator 
control house HVAC.
(Journet & Kling 1984:181)
Note that in (16) the description of each activity 1s lettered 
instead of numbered. In addition, these letters appear spatially 
separate from the text, unlike the numbers used 1n (15) above. In
(16) the repetition of spatial orientation (i.e., separation from 
text) also foregrounds the semantic distinctions between "activities"
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and the rest of the text.
As a final example of enumeratlve cohesion, consider the excerpt 
below from Deere & Company’s basic Instructions for changing motor 
o11:
(17) There are three main kinds of oil filters:
* Through bolt
* Internal
* Spin on 
(Journet & Kling 1984:85)
Note that the enumeratlve elements in (17) are neither numbers nor 
letters, but simply asterisks. Again though, the types of oil 
filters are connected by the repetition of a graphic element (I.e., 
"*”) and of a spatial orientation (i.e., separation from the text).
Consider the difference in cohesion when enumeratlve elements are 
not repeated 1n the example below which is adapted from (17).
(17’) There are three main kinds of oil filters: through 
bolt, internal and spin on.
The lack of enumeratlve elements in (17*) certainly doesn’t result in 
Incoherence, but the degree of cohesion (and therefore the ease of 
perceiving semantic distinctions) is reduced 1n (17’) compared to
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(17). The repetition of enumeratlve elements In (17) foregrounds the 
semantic distinction between the group of oil filters and the rest of 
the text.
Charts. The final type of graphic cohesion considered Involves 
the use of charts. (The term “chart” here refers to the general 
class of which charts, graphs, diagrams and tables are examples.) In 
general, charts are cohesive when a graphic element 1s repeated, 
producing a uniform background which heightens the contrast between 
semantic elements.
Manning (1989) has provided an illuminating account of chart 
types. A brief explication of his theory will also Illuminate the 
cohesive properties of each type. Manning argues that there are four 
basic chart types which are characterized by four possible 
combinations of two elements: units and properties. Specifically,
one possible combination gives us a chart, which represents the 
relation between one unit and one property. For example, we might 
use a pie chart to Illustrate the distribution of money 1n 1989 (one 
property) at Louisiana State University (one unit). Another possible 
combination gives us a graph, which represents the relation between 
more than one unit and one property. For example, we might use a bar 
graph to Illustrate the distribution of money in 1989 (one property) 
at five universities (five units). Yet another possible combination 
gives us a figure, which represents the relation between one unit
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and more than one property. For example, we might use a figure to 
depict the distribution of money separately over five years (five 
properties) at L.S.U. (one unit). Finally, the last possible 
combination gives us a table, which represents the relation between 
more than one unit and more than one property. For example, we might 
use a table to Illustrate the distribution of money separately over 
five years (five properties) at five universities (five units).
Because all graphs repeat units (e.g., five universities) and all 
figures repeat properties (e.g., the distribution of money over five 
years), and tables repeat both units and properties, the use of any 
of these three chart types 1s inherently cohesive. For Instance, the 
example table below 1s modified from a proposal written by a 
consulting firm of engineers.
(18) Table 2 Estimated Budget Solid Waste Characterization
Personnel Services Hours Rate i/hr Total
Project Director 120 $ 36 $4,320
J. Staff Engineer 376 17 6,392
Statistician 56 25 1,400
(Journet & Kling 1984:140)
Note that the table 1n (18) contains repeated classifications of
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personnel (i.e., units), as well as repeated figures for hours worked 
and hourly wage rate (i.e., both properties). The repetition of 
these chart elements provides a background against which semantic 
contrasts (e.g., between personnel and hourly rates) are
foregrounded.
Charts can also be used cohesively 1n other ways. For example, 
consider the excerpt below from an Informative report on television 
studio production facilities:
(19) The importance of independent producers can be seen 1n 
data describing prime time programming shares for 1970 
and 1978. To Illustrate, Table One describes the 
market share distribution of...series. (Journet & Kling 
1984:192)
Note that 1n (19) the text repeats the units (I.e., producers) and
properties (I.e., market shares both for 1970 and for 1978) which are
represented 1n the table which appears below 1t on the same page. 
The repetition highlights the semantic contrasts between the 
producers and their market shares.
As another example of cohesion produced through the use of 
charts, Figure 2 was taken from a description of a pen written by the 
editors of Encyclopedia Br1tann1ca.
Chapter Five - 156
Figure 2
Fountain Pen
lever ink reservoirpoint
Figure 3
Ball-point Pen
push
buttonpoint (retracted) spring ink reservoir
ball
Note that this figure 1s Inherently cohesive because 1t repeats 
properties (e.g., point and lever) of one unit (i.e., a fountain 
pen). Now consider Figure 3.
Note that some of the same properties are repeated 1n both Figure 2 
and Figure 3 (e.g., "point”). While both diagrams are cohesive
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alone, their co-occurrence 1n the description of pens produces 
another cohesive relation through repetition of the same properties. 
These repetitions create a similar background which helps to 
distinguish the semantic differences between the properties of the 
two types of pens.
Cohesive ties may also Involve two chart types. For Instance, an 
owner’s handbook for a lawn edger/trlmmer contains a diagram 1n which 
each Individual part of the edger 1s numbered (Journet & KL1ng 1984: 
106). In addition, the handbook contains a table which gives a 
description of the edger’s parts, as well as the co-indexed numbers 
from the diagram (Journet & Kling 1984:107). In this case, the 
repetition of the numbers in both the diagram and the table creates a 
formal cohesive tie. Consider the effect on cohesion 1n this 
example, if the table simply omitted the numbers which are co-indexed 
with those denoting parts in the diagram. In this case, cohesion 
between the two charts would be destroyed.
In this section, I have described various types of graphic 
cohesion: typography, enumeration and charts. In each case, the
repetition of some visual element 1n a text creates a uniform 
background against which semantic distinctions are foregrounded and 
therefore more easily perceived.
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CONCLUSIONS
Although HalHday and Hasan claim that cohesion 1s a semantic 
relation, I have suggested that cohesion might be better understood 
as a general perceptual phenomenon 1n which repetitions of both 
formal and semantic elements provide a uniform background against 
which semantic distinctions are foregrounded and therefore more 
easily perceived. Other researchers have noted that formal cohesive 
devices (e.g., syntactic parallelism and typography) are important in 
producing cohesion. I have argued here that the exclusion of such
formal devices limits the utility of Halliday and Hasan’s theory and 
that this exclusion 1s the result of their reliance on the analysis 
of a fictional text 1n developing their theory. In order to 
supplement HalHday and Hasan’s categories of cohesive devices, I
presented three types of formal cohesion based on an analysis of 
non-fictional, professionally written texts. First, I discussed 
cohesion produced through the repetition of topics and comments
(thematic progression); second, I Illustrated cohesion produced
through the repetition of syntactic structure (parallelism); and
finally I discussed cohesion produced through the repetition of
typography, enumerators and chart elements (graphic devices). Future 
research should explore the utility of the perceptual model for
explaining how semantic cohesion 1s produced. In addition, 
researchers might investigate the use of a perceptual model for
distinguishing between cohesion and coherence.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship of cohesion with coherence 1s uncertain. While 
most researchers agree that the use of cohesive devices 1s a 
necessary but Insufficient component of coherence (e.g., Halliday & 
Hasan 1976, van D1jk 1980, Bamberg 1983, McCulley 1985, and Tierney & 
Hosenthal 1983), there appears to be little additional agreement
about the nature of the relationship between these two phenomena. 
First, one researcher has found that only certain lexical categories 
of cohesion predicted coherence (McCulley 1985), while others have 
assumed the importance* of all Halliday and Hasan’s categories for 
producing coherence (e.g., Bamberg 1983). Second, many researchers 
have proposed a role for the presuppositions of the reader in
understanding cohesion and coherence (e.g., Bellert 1970, Halliday & 
Hasan 1976, van D1jk 1980, Witte 1981, and Hartnett 1986). However, 
only two of these five argue that presuppositions play a part in 
producing cohesion (Halliday & Hasan 1976 and Hartnett 1986), while 
the other three argue for the relevance of presuppositions to
coherence. And, third, researchers have emphasized the role of 
repetition, but some have claimed repetition is Important for
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coherence (e.g., Lybbert & Cummings 1969 and Bellert 1970), while 
others argue for its Importance 1n cohesion (e.g., Halliday & Hasan 
1976 and Witte & Faigley 1981).
Although a number of studies have improved the comprehensiveness 
of cohesion theory by analyzing a variety of discourse genres as well 
as by proposing new and modified types of cohesive elements, I have 
discussed at least three general problems with current theories of 
cohesion (Campbell in review). First, no theory has convincingly 
defined the nature of lexical cohesion or distinguished the nature of 
this cateogory from reference and conjunctive cohesion. Second, no 
theory has yet offered a convincing and revealing explanation of the 
nature of all cohesion, including both semantic and formal devices. 
And, third, we do not currently understand the role of reader 
presuppositions and repetitions of textual elements for producing 
cohesion and/or coherence or the nature of the relationship between 
cohesion and coherence.
With the repetition theory of cohesion presented in Campbell 
(forthcoming), we have come a long way in solving these problems. 
First, repetition theory offers a revealing explanation of the nature 
of all cohesion, including both semantic and formal devices. I 
argued that models of the visual perception of figure-ground 
relations are analogous to our perception of cohesion in discourse. 
Specifically, repetitions of formal and semantic elements provide a 
kind of homogneous background against which novel semantic
Chapter Six - 165
distinctions are foregrounded. Second, repetition theory 
distinguishes the nature of Halliday and Hasan’s categories of 
reference and lexical cohesion by proposing that lexical Items can 
produce ties with either their deictic or sense components (or
both). And, third, repetition theory explains the relevance of
repetitions of textual elements for producing cohesion. However, 
some of those questions remain: What 1s the role of reader
presuppositions in making a text? What 1s the nature of coherence
and how can it be distinguished from cohesion? How do coherence and
cohesion interact? I hope to show, in the next section, that the use
of an analogy with visual perception theory can also elucidate these 
unknowns.
PERCEPTION AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Manning suggests that "we require a broader theory of 'effective 
representation’ (i.e., communication or rhetoric) in which writing 
can be compared to other forms of signification" (1988:242). His 
work on the relevance of visual perception and writing has provided 
an Illuminating theory of the distinction between literary and 
technical discourse (1988). Specifically, Manning illustrates that 
"distinct types of line drawings replicate the 1iterary/technical 
contrast in a visual medium" (1988:241). That contrast is due to the 
differences in the viewer/reader’s perceptions. Consider the
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following example, adapted from Manning’s article.
Imagine a drawing of a bird which 1s partly composed of several
similar lines to create the illusion of feathers. This iterative
detail "promotes the perception of actual physical appearance" 
(1988:252). In contrast, imagine a map which is partly composed of 
clearly distinct features (e.g., red lines for state highways and 
black lines for county roads). This seotHLStl^fi detail "promotes 
the perception of conceptual comparisons" (1988:252) not physical 
appearance. The viewer perceives the drawing as a substitute for 
the bird it represents, while s/he perceives the map as a standard 
by which the roads 1t represents can be understood. Manning argues
that the most effective technical writing is perceived as a standard,
predominated by contrastive detail, while the most effective 
literature is perceived as a substitute, predominated by iterative 
detail. Thus Manning establishes the relevance of models of visual 
perception to discourse analysis.1 Similarly, I argue here that 
the nature of both cohesion and coherence can be better understood by 
analogy with models of visual perception. In the next section, I 
will present a theory of coherence based on such perception theory 
and propose a description of the interaction between cohesion and 
coherence.
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Coherence as Fulfillment
The nature of coherence, like the nature of cohesion, can be 
elucidated by analogy with perceptual theory. In a psychology 
classic, Broadbent describes perceptual anticipation:
When a tennis player strikes a ball, the stroke 1s not
controlled by Information coming from the ball at the
Instant when the racket reaches it...The eye indeed
records the position of the ball well 1n advance of the 
movement, but the position is not that at which the 
blow 1s struck, because the ball moves during reaction 
time (1958:284).
I propose that coherence is the result of the £yJ£jJJjBsn£ of such 
perceptual anticipation. For instance, imagine that the tennis
player above anticipates the position of the ball at his right side
and prepares to use a forehand shot; the ball then passes by his left
side, requiring a backhand shot. The event 1s incoherent to the
player if (1) what he anticipated did not occur and (2) he cannot 
infer a reason for the unfulfillment (e.g., a gust of wind changed 
the course of the ball).
There would appear to be two general types of fulfillment based
on knowledge of the world and knowledge of language. Part of our
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knowledge of the world can be described 1n terms of scripts. Schank 
and Abelson define a script as "a predetermined, stereotyped sequence 
of actions that defines a well-known situation'1 (1977:41). So, for 
example, a violation of our expectations about a script, as in (1) 
below, will produce incoherence.
(1) (A police officer has pulled over a car on the 
freeway.)
Driver: What's the problem, Officer?
Officer: No problem. I just wanted to tell you
how much I like your car.
Drivers expect the events in the above scene to include at least an 
explanation of some driver error by the officer. Since that 
anticipated event does not take place in the discourse above, that 
discourse is perceived as incoherent.2
In contrast, our knowledge of language can be described in terms 
of phonological, syntactic, and semantic structure. A violation of 
our expectations about linguistic structure will also cause- 
incoherence. (In fact, such violations might be perceived as more 
seriously Incoherent than violations based on our knowledge of the 
world.) For example, consider the two short discourses below.
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(2) A: Do you play golf on the weekends?
B: No. I ndake Instead.
(2’) A: Do you play golf on the weekends?
B: No. I dake Instead.
When talking with other English speakers, we expect that the 
phonological rules of our language will be followed. However, in (2) 
the use of the word ndake violates these expectations because English 
prohibits the use of nd 1n word-1n1t1al position. Thus (2) is 
perceived as incoherent. Note that, although (2’) also contains an 
unknown word dake. it 1s perceived as more coherent than (2) because 
the unknown word conforms to our expectations about the phonological 
structure of English words.
What I am proposing here is actually quite similar to the 
positions of a number of researchers who have noted that at least 
part of the coherence of a text depends on the presuppositions of the 
reader (e.g., Bellert 1970, Witte 1981, Fahnestock 1983, and Hartnett 
1986). Bellert writes that interpreting a text 1s partly a result of
drawing a set of consequences from a written utterance (1970:335). 
For example, consider the sentence below.
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(3) Play stopped in the bottom of the third Inning
while the team from the Dominican Republic changed 
pitchers (Gammons, 1989:16).
Since (3) 1s the first sentence 1n a story titled "Plei Bol" 
appearing in Sports Illustrated, the reader may draw some of the
following conclusions: (a) this is a story about baseball; (b)
the story is describing part of game in which one team is from a
country called the Dominican Republic; and (c) the Dominican 
Republic’s pitcher is not doing a good job and is being replaced 
early in this game.
The reader’s conclusions serve to limit his or her
expectations about what will appear in the rest of the story.
For instance, consider the following.
(3’) Play stopped in the bottom of the third inning
while the team from the Dominican Republic changed
pitchers. The Mexican club...had just taken a 3-0
lead, and the stadium...was in a fandango of
excitement (Gammons, 1989:16).
In (3’), the reader’s expectations appear to be fulfilled (I.e., not 
violated). For example, the appearance of club, stadium and 3-0 lead 
all suggest that this is indeed a story about baseball. Thus, the
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reader perceives this short text as coherent (so far) since his 
expectations are fulfilled.
In contrast, consider the following example.
(3” ) PI ay stopped in the bottom of the third inning 
while the team from the Dominican Republic changed 
pitchers. Russell bought apples at the store.
In (3” ), the reader’s expectations appear to be unfulfilled (i.e., 
violated). In other words, this short text will be perceived as 
incoherent if the reader anticipated a story about baseball, and s/he 
cannot infer an acceptable reason for being informed about Russell’s 
shopping in connection with the Dominican Republic’s baseball game.
The theory of scripts affords us a way of describing another type 
of what Halliday and Hasan call collocation. In (3’) the use of 
club, stadium and 3-0 lead produces coherence because these words and 
their meanings are all associated with the same script— a baseball 
game. In contrast, the words inning and apples are not associated 
with the same script and thus do not produce coherence.3
The Relationship between Cohesion and Coherence
Now I want to turn to coherence and semantic cohesion produced 
through the repetition of semantic features because it is precisely
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this area which has blurred the relationship between cohesion and 
coherence. HcCulley (1985) establishes that, of all Halliday and 
Hasan's lexical cohesion categories, only synonomy, hyponomy, and 
collocation (I.e., what I have labeled antonomy and 
script-assoclation) predict coherence. Although no explanation is 
offered by McCulley, I believe the Repetition theory of cohesion 
(Campbell in review) and the Fulfillment theory I have outlined here 
can offer such an explanation. Consider the text below.
(4) I had a car. But the Ford quit on me.
Note that the relationship between the two italicized words 1n (4) is 
one of hyponomy: the sense of the word Ford includes the sense of the 
word car. In other words, all of the semantic features of car (e.g., 
[-living], [+4-wheeled], [+combustion engine], etc.) are included in 
the sense of the word Ford. Thus the use of these two words is 
SOhMiyg because of the repetition of semantic features. In 
addition, note that the use of the word Ford fulfills our 
expectations about the word car; in fact, Ford may be the 
prototypical car for some of us. Thus the use of these two words is 
SSbaiaQt because the expectations which result from the use of car 
are fulfilled by Ford.
In contrast, consider the text below.
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(4*)I had a car. But the Sterling quit on me.
Note that the use of the two italicized words car and Sterling 1s 
because of the repetition of semantic features (I.e., a 
Sterling 1s a British car). However, for most Americans the use of 
these two words in (4’) is relatively compared to those
1n (10) because our expectations prompted by our knowledge of the 
word car are not fulfilled by the use of Sterling.
In essence, I am claiming that the use of words related through 
hyponomy, synonomy, and antonomy will produce both cohesion and 
coherence, while script-assoclation will produce only coherence 
because 1t Involves only and not repetition.
Therefore, McCulley found that of all Halliday and Hasan’s categories 
of cohesion only hyponomy, synonomy, and collocation predicted 
coherence.
COHERENCE CONDITIONS ON COHESION
Some of our expectations are founded on our knowledge of 
discourse (the intersection of our knowledge about the world and 
about language). It appears that there are constraints on the types 
of repetition we expect in well-formed texts. This section describes 
two such conditions. First, a redundancy condition on semantic 
cohesion is discussed. And, second, a similarity condition on formal
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cohesion 1s described.
The Redundancy Condition4
Our expectations about well-formed texts appear to be best 
fulfilled when sufficient new information 1s added whenever sense 
elements are repeated (I.e., in one type of semantic cohesion). For 
instance, consider the examples below.
(5) I had a Ford. But the old buggy died.
(6)?IJb|d a Ford. But my car died.
Note that the italicized and boldfaced items highlight sense 
repetition in both (5) and (6). In (5), the use of Ford and old
buggy results in the repetition of semantic features (e.g., 
[-living], [+4-wheeled], [+transportat1on], etc.). Likewise, the use 
of Ford and car is cohesive as discussed above 1n example (4). In 
addition, (6) demonstrates repetition through the use of I had and 
ray, which both signify the locus of ownership. Note that (5) is 
significantly more acceptable than (6). This perception appears to 
depend on the relative lack of new Information in (6) compared to
(5). Our efficient use of langauge 1s thus "enforced" by a 
constraint on the amount of sense repetition we expect 1n a 
well-formed text. Thus, too much redundancy in a text is perceived
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as relatively Incoherent.
The Similarity Condition
Our expectations about well-formed texts also appear to Include a 
constraint on the lexical Items which may be connected through the 
repetition of formal elements (i.e., in formal cohesion). For
example, consider the examples below.
(7) The HARD drive was repaired. But the DISK drive was
broken.
(7’) The hard drive was REPAIRED. But the disk drive was
BROKEN.
(7” )?The HARD drive was repaired. But the disk drive was 
BROKEN.
Note that the repetition of distinctive typography (i.e., the use of 
all capital letters) 1n each of these examples produces formal
cohesion. The lexical Items hard and disk are thus connected in (7); 
repaired and broken 1n (71); and hard and broken in (7” ). Note 
also, however, that (7” ) 1s significantly less acceptable than (7) 
or (7’). Apparently, we expect that formally connected lexical items
must be sufficiently like each other and unlike other items. Thus,
the connection made between hard and broken violates our expectations
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about well-formed texts, making (7” ) relatively Incoherent compared 
to (7) or (7’). Notice also that this similarity condition on formal 
cohesion accounts for the need to reserve one typographic option for 
one type of connection so that readers don’t focus on unintended 
connections. For Instance, consider the examples below.
(8)?Consult The Handbook before submitting your thesis or 
dissertation.
(8’) Consult The Handbook before submitting your THESIS or 
DISSERTATION.
Note that typography connects The Handbook, thesis, and dissertation 
in (8), whereas only thesis and dissertation are connected in (8’). 
The formal cohesion effected by the use of italics in (8) connects 
lexical items which are not sufficiently alike and thus (8) violates 
the similarity condition, making (8) relatively incoherent compared 
with (8’).
SUMMARY
Researchers show little agreement about the nature of the 
relationship between cohesion and coherence, although most assume 
that they are related. Using perceptual theory, Campbell (in review) 
proposes a Repetition theory of cohesion in which repetitions connect
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elements 1n a text. Here I have argued that perceptual concepts are 
also useful 1n describing the nature of coherence. A Fulfillment 
theory was described 1n which reader’s expectations determine the 
relative coherence or Incoherence of texts. In addition, two 
coherence conditions on cohesion were proposed. First, the 
Redundancy Condition constrains the amount of old information which 
is acceptable in a discourse. Second, the Similarity Condition 
constrains the lexical items which can be acceptably connected 
through formal cohesion.
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NOTES
1Space permits only a short discussion of Manning’s Ideas. For 
a comprehensive and skillful presentation, consult his work.
2I am not claiming that this discourse 1s completely Impossible 
to comprehend. It seems clear that both cohesion and coherence are 
not binary perceptions, which are either perfectly present or 
perfectly absent. Instead, we appear to perceive relative degrees of 
these phenomena. My claim here 1s that the discourse between the 
officer and driver 1s perceived as relatively Incoherent compared to 
one in which the officer explains that the driver was exceeding the 
speed limit; thus conforming to.the driver’s anticipation based on 
his knowledge of this script.
zWh1le the use of words from a script produces coherence, that 
usage cannot be called cohesive within this theory proposed here 
because no real repetition of referents or features 1s Involved.
4I want to thank Tom Walsh for providing the relevant data for 
this condition.
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Conclusions - 182
The fundamental argument of the six articles collected 1n this 
dissertation is that discourse analysis can be a lucrative approach to 
understanding professional writing and therefore to improving writing
instruction. Chapters Two and Three demonstrate the utility of Speech Act 
theory for understanding problems in tone. Although textbook advice is 
often too vague or unprincipled to benefit novice writers, the discourse 
anlysis approach offers a principled, explicit account of such advice.
Chapters Four, Five, and Six demonstrate the need for a better theory of 
cohesion. Professionally written discourse is analyzed in order to show 
that current theories are inadequate. This discourse analysis approach
should ultimately result in better pedagogy since it provides a way of 
describing the knowledge that expert writers must have in order to produce 
we11-written texts.
However, as Chapter One argues, discourse based research is relatively 
unpopular among writing researchers. That chapter demonstrates the
imoportance of declarative discourse knowledge in the writing process in 
order to encourage more attention toward building a comprehensive model of 
that knowledge. In addition, Chapter One shows how discourse theory can 
be put to use in the writing classroom in order to improve writing 
teachers’ ability to deal effectively with students who cannot infer the
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principles of good writing. Finally, that chapter attempts to clear away 
two potential obstacles to more enthusiasm about discourse theory 1n 
professional writing. First, writing specialists should recognize that 
both process and discourse research must study cognition Indirectly by 
Investigating the products of that mind. Second, writing specialists 
should take responsibility for discourse research themselves instead of 
relying on those outside composition.
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